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Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free
Exercise as Expression
William P. Marshall*
The Jehovah's Witnesses cases of the 1930's and 1940's conclusively established that the freedoms of religious exercise
and expression are not mutually exclusive.1 Activities of the
Witnesses undertaken as part of their religious mission were
2
found protected as expression under the first amendment.
This alone is not surprising. Actions or laws often implicate
more than one constitutional protection. What is surprising is
the extent to which the freedom of expression guarantee has
pervaded the area of religious exercise. Activities such as
4
prayer,3 worship, and even matters of religious conscience,
which one might think would implicate only religious concerns,
have been held to be protected by the freedom of expression in
certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court has found no aspect of religion to be
governed exclusively by the free exercise clause. 5 Indeed, the
relationship between religious exercise and expression is so ex* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. The author wishes to
express his appreciation to Professors Geoffrey Stone, Douglas Laycock and
Erwin Chemerinsky for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
Special gratitude must also be extended to Maripat Flood and Britt Hanson for
their invaluable research assistance.
1. See infra'notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1943) (municipal ordinance requiring payment of license tax to distribute religious literature
struck down); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943)
(tax on religious pamphlet distribution stricken); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (statute prohibiting "fighting words" upheld
against free speech and free exercise challenge by a Jehovah's Witness who
had been convicted under the statute).
3. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (prayer protected
as right of expression, requiring equal access to university facilities for religious student groups).
4. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (freedom of
mind, or conscience, protected as right of expression).
5. Although the Court has extended a broader protection to religious conscience under the free exercise clause than under the free speech clause, it has
not indicated that free exercise is the exclusive vehicle under which religious
conscience may be protected. Compare Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) with Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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tensive that in nearly all cases in which the Court has sustained a litigant's religious objections to a religiously neutral
law or regulation, it has done so with reference to freedom of
expression. The Court has relied solely on the free exercise
clause in only three cases. 6 Given this background, the suggestion is implicit that the Court should review all claims brought
by religious proponents seeking exemption from laws of general applicability according to a free expression analysis, not an
7
independent free exercise analysis.
The Court has never explicitly adopted this approach.
Nonetheless, three developments have emerged in first amendment jurisprudence that militate in favor of construing free exercise as a subspecies of expression. First, the Court's current
treatment of free exercise issues has proved wholly unsatisfactory and has produced results which are unpredictable, inconsistent, and rife with inherent constitutional difficulties.8
Second, the cases culminating in Widmar v. Vincent 9 suggest
that the values and activities at the heart of free exercise are
already protected as expression.1O Consequently, extending
greater protection to religious beliefs than to secular beliefs
may not promote any substantial interest. Finally, religious
concerns do not exist in a vacuum; they necessarily affect the
values encompassed by the freedom of expression." Recognition of this impact of religion in the society requires that religious freedom be placed on equal footing, both in definition and
12
vitality, with secular rights of expression.
This Article suggests that freedom of expression and free
6. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-10 (1963).
7. Permitting exemptions to laws of general applicability only on the
ground of free expression, even when the exemption is sought as a free exercise right, is not a significant limitation on the meaning of the free exercise
clause. Its application as a basis for exception began in 1963 with Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and has only been utilized by the Court in two instances since that time. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972). For a definition of the role the
free exercise clause may play under the restrictive approach posited in this Article, see infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 16-69 and accompanying text.
9. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
10. Id. at 269. The Court stated: "[Rleligious worship and discussion...
are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment." Id.
See also infra notes 88-131 and accompanying text.
11. See Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause, 90
YALE L.TJ. 350, 369 (1980) (religious exemption has significant effects outside of

religious spheres).
12. See infra notes 183-219 and accompanying text.
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exercise provide a unitary protection for individual liberty. In
short, whether an activity is protected by the first amendment
should not turn on its being construed as religious or secular.
Claims based on religion are not entitled to judicially created
exemptions from laws of general applicability unless such exemptions are available to those advancing manifestations of
secular ideas as well. This approach would require that no
more stringent protection be allowed free exercise claims than
would be granted to comparable secular activity.13 Although
the approach advocated in this Article effectively displaces or
eliminates areas of protection arguably provided by the free exercise clause, the approach does not entirely eschew a role for
the free exercise clause. The free exercise clause may still provide an important source of protection for religious autonomy,14
and against laws that attempt to discriminate directly against
religious practice.'S
Part I of this Article evaluates the difficulties with the
Court's current approach to the free exercise clause. Part H
discusses Widmar v. Vincent, which, it is submitted, foreshad13. This principle may be illustrated by applying it to Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, Amish parents claimed that Wisconsin's compulsory education laws violated their free exercise rights, because the Amish faith
forbids public education beyond eighth grade. Id. at 207-09. Under the test posited, the holding in Yoder granting exemption to religious adherents who opposed compulsory education could not be sustained unless such an exemption
would be granted to those who opposed compulsory education on secular
grounds, and only if the court determined that the manifestation of this dissent
inhered of an aspect of expression.
14. Professor Laycock has described the right of religious autonomy as
"the right of churches to make for themselves the decisions that arise in the
course of running their institutions." Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of ChurchLabor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L REv. 1373, 1394 (1981). A doctrine of religious autonomy, for example, recognizes the right of a church to settle disputes over control of church property, church organization, and entitlement to ecclesiastical
office. Id. at 1394. The Supreme Court has on one occasion specifically identified a right to church autonomy as a free exercise right. See Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 100, 107-08,
115-16, 119-21 (1952). See also Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion
Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment; 27 U.C.LJ.A L. REv. 1195, 1210-14, 1230-45
(1980). Although church autonomy has usually been considered a component
of the entanglement doctrine under the establishment clause, this view has
been criticized. See Laycock, supra at 1416 ("[elfforts to base the right [to
church autonomy] on the establishment clause are mistaken, because that
clause forbids support of religion, not interference with religion."). There appears to be no reason why the free exercise clause cannot provide an even
broader grant of church autonomy than has yet been accorded. See generally
Laycock, supra.
15. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (Court struck down provision
barring clergy from serving as delegates to state constitutional convention).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:545

ows the approach advocated in this Article. Part Im focuses on
an array of Supreme Court cases to illustrate that the Court
has already substantially subsumed the right of free exercise
within its definition and application of the freedom of expression. Consequently, construing the free exercise clause as having no independent vitality in cases in which exemptions are
sought from laws of general applicability is not a significant
limitation on the meaning of the clause. In Part IV, the argument for a favored status for religious exercise vis-a-vis manifestations of other conscientiously held beliefs is rejected. The
alternative approach offered by this Article, circumscribing pro-

tection of religious conscience within free expression parameters, is then explained and defended by reference to the case
law and general principles of equal treatment.

I. THE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE COURT'S CURRENT
APPROACH TO FREE EXERCISE
Since Sherbert v. Verner,16 the Court has sporadically and
inconsistently written religious exemptions into regulations of
general applicability.17 This process raises numerous constituapplication, 18
tional problems, including problems of arbitrary
2
20
1
establishment of religion, 9 equal protection, and definition. '
The tortuous path the Court has followed in its application
of the free exercise clause is illustrated by two sets of irrecon16. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventist granted an exemption to
South Carolina law that denied unemployment benefits to plaintiff when she
refused to work on Saturday because of her religion).
17. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
See also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
See generally M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoLrrIcs 39-40 (1978) (examining religious based exemptions); R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 145-55
(1972); Kurland, The Irrelevanceof the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
FirstAmendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Vni. L R.v. 3,16-17 (1978) (criticizing religious exemption doctrine); Note, supra note 11, at 354 (present state
of religious exemption doctrine is unclear).
18. See Note, supra note 11, at 355-56 (current exemption test is flawed and
leads to "inconsistent and unprincipled decisions").
19. See Kurland, supra note 17, at 15-18 (Supreme Court has not reconciled
exemptions based on religion); Note, supra note 11, at 356 (religious exemption
doctrine has not yet adequately resolved establishment clause problems).
20. See Note, supra note 11, at 356 (free exercise protection may violate
general notions of equal treatment).
21. See R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 149-52 (court cannot identify a religious claimant unless it has a definition of religion); Weiss, Privilege,Posture,
and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE LJ. 593, 622 (1964) (religious
exemptions require the Court to become entangled in defining religion); Note,
supra note 11, at 356-57 (courts have failed to define religion consistently).
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23
cilable cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder22 and United States v. Lee,
24
2
and Sherbert v. Verner and Braunfeld v. Brourn. 5 In Yoder,
the Court exempted the Amish from Wisconsin's compulsory
education laws on free exercise grounds. 2 6 Amish parents had
been convicted of violating a Wisconsin law requiring children
to attend school until age sixteen. 2V The parents claimed that
their religion forbade school attendance beyond eighth grade,
when the Amish way of life dictated that informal vocational

training was necessary to prepare children for an agrarian lifestyle.28 The Court found that Wisconsin's legitimate interest in
the education of children was not sufficiently compelling to
29
overcome the free exercise violation.
More recently, in United States v. Lee, 30 the Court refused

to grant exemption from the federal social security system to
an Amish farmer and carpenter who objected that payment or
receipt of public insurance benefits was forbidden by their
faith.1 The Court had no difficulty finding that the social se-

curity system's mandatory participation infringed upon the litigant's free exercise rights.32 Nonetheless, the Court held that
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23.

455 U.S. 252 (1982).

24. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
25.

366 U.S. 599 (1961).

26. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
27. Id. at 208-09. The respondents, members of the old order Amish religion, had declined to send their children, aged fourteen and fifteen, to public
school after the children completed eighth grade. They were convicted of violating a compulsory school attendance law and fined $5 each. Id. at 207-08.
28. Id. at 209-10. Testimony at trial indicated the Amish parents believed
their religion required their children to follow a life apart from the rest of the
world and to make their living by farming. Id. at 210. The Amish objection to
secondary education was based on their belief that their children would be exposed to impermissible worldly values, including competitiveness, worldly success and other values opposed to the Amish beliefs. Id. at 211.
29. Id. at 221-34. Although the Court's decision ultimately turned on free
exercise grounds, it apparently rested in part upon the right of parents to direct
the education of their children. Id. at 232-34.
30. 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
31. Id. at 1054. Appellee had employed several Amish persons in his carpentry and farming businesses from 1970-1977. He refused to file the social security forms required of employers and to withhold social security taxes from
his employees' paychecks. When the Internal Revenue Service assessed him
with back employment taxes, he paid the first installment and then sued for a
refund, charging that imposition of the taxes violated his and his employees'
free exercise rights. Id. at 1053-54.
32. Id. at 1055. The Court noted that "[tihe Amish believe that there is a
religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of
assistance contemplated by the social security system," and accepted the
Amish contention that payment and receipt of social security taxes interfered
with this obligation. Id.
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free exercise did not require an exemption from the social security statute, because the governmental interest in providing
public insurance was compelling.33 Distinguishing Yoder, the
Court stated, "[ulnlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, it would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive
social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a
wide variety of religious beliefs."3 4 Justice Stevens's concurrence viewed the majority's attempt to distinguish Yoder as unpersuasive: "The Court's attempt to distinguish Yoder is
unconvincing because precisely the same religious interest is
implicated in both cases and Wisconsin's interest in requiring
its children to attend school until they reach the age of 16 is
surely not inferior to the federal interest in collecting these so3 5
cial security taxes."
Similar inconsistencies are present in the Court's treatment of Sherbert v. Verner 36 and Braunfeld v. Brown.37 Braunfeld decided whether Orthodox Jewish merchants whose
religion forbade Saturday work could be punished for violating
the state's Sunday closing laws. 38 The Court refused to carve
33. Id. at 1056. "Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound
tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment
of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax." Id. The Court noted that the
social security system serves the public good by providing a comprehensive insurance program for the old and disabled. Mandatory participation is imperative to maintain the program's fiscal integrity. Id. at 1055. The Court stated
that the proper inquiry was whether accommodation of the Amish farmer's beliefs would unduly interfere with the government's interest. Concluding that it
would, the Court stated that social security taxes were indistinguishable from
general taxes and that "[t]he tax system could not function if denominations
were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in
a manner that violates their religious belief." Id. at 1056.
34. Id. at 1056.
35. Id. at 1058 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). The majority had intimated
that the government's interest in maintaining a national tax system was somehow more compelling than Wisconsin's interest in compulsory education in
Yoder. Id. at 1056. The majority also distinguished Yoder on the ground that
exemptions to Wisconsin's compulsory education laws were somehow easier to
accommodate than exemptions to the tax system. Id. Finally, the majority
noted that if a religious exemption from social security were allowed, there
would be no principled way to disallow a similar exemption from the national
income tax system. Id.
36. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
37. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
38. Id. at 601-02. The case involved the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania
criminal statute proscribing retail sales on Sundays. Appellants were Philadelphia merchants who sold clothing and home furnishings. According to appellants, the Orthodox Jewish faith required the closing of appellants' businesses
and abstention from work from sundown Friday until nightfall on Saturday.
They contended that they had previously remained open on Sundays to compensate for closing their businesses in observance of their faith on Saturdays,
and that the Pennsylvania criminal statute proscribing Sunday retail sales
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out an exemption for Sabbatarians, 9 and rejected the argument that the economic burden imposed on Sabbatarian
merchants contravened the free exercise of religion.40 The
Court reasoned that mere inconvenience or competitive disadvantage to some religions was not sufficient to compel an ex41
emption on free exercise grounds.
In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged from
her job because her religion prevented her from working on
Saturdays. 42 Unable to find another employer who would accommodate her religious practices, Mrs. Sherbert applied for
state unemployment compensation and was denied benefits because, under South Carolina's regulatory scheme, she had "refused suitable work when offered" and her refusal was not
based on "good cause." 43 In holding that Mrs. Sherbert was enworked an economic hardship on them in violation of their free exercise rights.
Id.
39. Id. at 608-09.
40. Id. at 601-02, 608. The Court stated.
Appellants contend that the enforcement against them of the Pennsylvania statute will prohibit the free exercise of their religion because,
due to the statute's compulsion to close on Sunday, appellants will suffer substantial economic loss, to the benefit of their non-Sabbatarian
competitors, if appellants also continue their Sabbath observance by
closing their businesses on Saturday; that this result will either compel
appellants to give up their Sabbath observance, a basic tenet of the Orthodox Jewish faith, or will put appellants at a serious economic disadvantage if they continue to adhere to their Sabbath.
Id. at 601-02. The appellants argued that free exercise justified an exemption to
the Sunday closing law, but the Court rejected this suggestion because such an
exemption might undermine the state's "goal of providing a day that, as best as
possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity." Id. at
608. The Court also cited enforcement problems with policing two days of rest
instead of one, and the competitive advantage that would result to those religions allowed an exemption who would then have a virtual monopoly of sales
on Sundays. Id. at 608-09.
41. Id. at 605-06. The Court stated that "the Sunday law simply regulates a
secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive." Id. at 605.
42. 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
43. Id. at 399-401. In a footnote, the Court made it clear that Mrs. Sherbert's reasons for refusing work were distinguishable from other personal reasons which the state could use as a basis for disqualification:
It has been suggested that appellant is not within the class entitled to
benefits under the South Carolina statute because her unemployment
did not result from discharge or layoff due to lack of work. It is true
that unavailability for work for some personal reasons not having to do
with matters of conscience or religion has been held to be a basis of
disqualification for benefits .... But appellant claims that the Free
Exercise Clause prevents the State from basing the denial of benefits
upon the "personal reason" she gives for not working on Saturday.
Where the consequence of disqualification so directly affects First
Amendment rights, surely we should not conclude that every "personal
reason" is a basis for disqualification in the absence of explicit lan-
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titled to unemployment benefits, the Court reasoned that the
state law impermissibly forced her to choose between economic disadvantage and religious imperatives. 44 Contrary to
the holding in Braunfeld, the Court created an exemption in
the South Carolina law for those whose religion prevented
them from working on Saturdays.45 The strikingly incongruous
results led Justice Stewart to remark: "[I] cannot agree that
today's decision can stand consistently with Braunfeld v.

Brown ....
In a similar vein, commentators have noted that the facts in
Sherbert appear to parallel closely those in Braunfeld.47 In
both cases, the burdens imposed were of a similar character 4 guage to that effect in the statute or decisions of the South Carolina
Supreme Court.
Id. at 401-02 n.4.
44. Id. at 404, 407. The Court stated: '"The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand." Id. at 404. After determining that the regulations
burdened Mrs. Sherbert's free exercise rights, the Court inquired whether that
burden was justified by any compelling state interest and found none. Id. at
406-09. The Cpurt rejected the possibility that spurious claims might dilute the
state's unemployment funds, noting that the state would still be required to
demonstrate "that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." Id. at 407.
45. The Court attempted to distinguish Braunfeld, asserting that the state
interest in Sherbert in preventing spurious claims from depleting the unemployment funds was "wholly dissimilar" to the state interest which saved the
Braunfeld statute:
[The interest in Braunfeld was] in providing one uniform day of rest
for all workers. That secular objective could be achieved ... only by
declaring Sunday to be that day of rest. Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians ... appeared to present an administration problem of such
magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable.
Id. at 408-09.
46. Id. at 417. (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. See R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 145-47 (Sherbert and Braunfeld cannot be reconciled); Ely, Legislativeand Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1322 (1970); Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free
Exercise, 61 GEo. L.J. 1115, 1139 (1973) (impossible to reconcile the cases);
Note, supra note 11, at 354 n.28 (the two cases have never been adequately
reconciled).
48. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart stated:
The Court says that there was a "less direct burden upon religious
practices" in that case [Braunfeld] than this. With all respect, I think
the Court is mistaken, simply as a matter of fact. The Braunfeld case
involved a state criminal statute .... The impact upon the appel-

lant's religious freedom in the present case is considerably less onerous. We deal here not with a criminal statute, but with the
particularized administration of South Carolina's Unemployment Compensation Act.
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forcing the plaintiff to choose between economic disadvantage
and religious duties. 49 In neither case did the government affirmatively compel any action which violated religious
scruples.SO Indeed, from this perspective, the statutory scheme
upheld in Braunfeld seems more suspect. Religious considerations undoubtedly influenced passage of the Sunday closing
law, while the unemployment compensation statute considered
in Sherbert was wholly neutral.
In addition to these inconsistencies, the current religious
exemption doctrine generates establishment clause questions

when religious conduct is singled out for favored judicial treatment.5 ' Justices Harlan and White emphasized the establishment problem in their Sherbert dissent.5 2 Justice Harlan stated
that because South Carolina law did not discriminate against

Mrs. Sherbert on the basis of her religion, free exercise required no exemption.5 3 Granting an exemption therefore
raised establishment clause questions, because the state was
required to "single out for financial assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though it denies such
assistance to others whose identical behavior (in this case, in54
ability to work on Saturdays) is not religiously motivated."

Id. (emphasis in original). See also R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 147.
49. R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 147.

50. Id.
51. This problem was noted most recently by Justice Stevens in United
States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1058 n.2 (1982). Concurring in the Court's decision
to deny an exemption from the social security system to an Amish farmer who
had raised a free exercise challenge, Justice Stevens said that the main reason
for employing a strong presumption against such exemptions was "the risk that
government approval of some [religious claims] and disapproval of others will
be perceived as favoring one religion over another" in violation of the establishnient clause. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). See Ely, supra note 47, at 1313-14
(religion clauses restrict the government from favoring or disfavoring specific
religions or religion generally); Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Casefor a Return to the Strict Interpretationof the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1463, 1485 (1981) ("strict neutrality requires that the free exercise clause be
subordinated to the establishment clause in every instance where the two doctrines are presently believed to conflict").
52. 374 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1963) (Harlan & White, JJ., dissenting).
53. Id. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan stated.
Thus in no proper sense can it be said that the State discriminated
against the appellant on the basis of her religious beliefs or that she
was denied benefits because she was a Seventh-day Adventist. She
was denied benefits just as any other claimant would be denied benefits who was not "available for work" for personal reasons.
Id. (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 422 (emphasis in original). According to Justice Harlan, the occasions when a state would be constitutionally compelled to carve out an exemption to laws of general applicability would be few and far between. Id. at 423.
Professor Laycock has also argued that the establishment clause objections to
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Singling out religious groups for special treatment raises

equal protection problems as well.5 5 Allowing special treatment for some violates fundamental notions of equal treatment.
One might well question, for example, why the Amish should
be excluded from compulsory education laws with which all
other groups, religious and secular, must comply. Although the
free exercise clause obviously reflects a commitment to the
protection of religious liberty, it is doubtful whether the concept of religion, as currently defined by the Supreme Court,56
presents a rational classification for the protection of any fun57
damental interest.
Still another difficulty created by religious exemptions is
that a constitutional definition of religion and an inquiry into
religious sincerity are necessary to determine who will be entitled to a special exemption.5 8 Constitutional definitions have
exemptions based upon the free exercise clause deserve to be taken more seriously. He observes that the result in Sherbert "Was to make the taxpayers pay
the costs of [the Sabbatarian's] religion, supplying her with the income that
her religion precluded her from earning." Laycock, supra note 14, at 1414.
55. See Note, supra note 11, at 356.
56. The Court has attempted to distinguish religious beliefs from personal
and philosophical beliefs without adequately defining either. See, e.g., Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1980); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16
(1972).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 211-14. Justice Douglas warned, in a
case involving the interpretation of "religion" for the purpose of determining
conscientious objector status under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
that any interpretation of the religion clauses that favored religious beliefs over
similarly principled nonreligious beliefs would result in "invidious discrimination" violative of equal protection doctrine. See Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 469 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. See generally R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 149-52 (court cannot identify a religious claimant unless it has a definition of religion); Weiss, supra note
21, at 622 (allowing religion based exemptions forces courts to become impermissibly enmeshed in defining what is religious); Note, supra note 11, at 356-57
(religious exemption unfairly favors one type of conscience over others).
The need for a sincerity test became especially acute in light of the religious exemption carved out for the unemployment compensation claimant in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Killilea, Standardsfor Expanding
Freedom of Conscience, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 531, 548 (1973) (without a sincerity
test, religious exemptions would be unmanageable and unsupportable because
there would be no way to distinguish between conscientious and fraudulent
claims).
The sincerity test has been used most often in cases in which the free exercise clause could easily have been abused by fraudulent claims. Claims have
been denied for lack of a sincerely held belief where claimants sought religious
exemptions from drug laws, see United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C.
1968); People v. Crawford, 69 Misc. 2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1972), a'd,72 Misc.
2d 1021, 340 N.Y.S.2d 848; from school integration, see Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); from
prison regulations, see Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1003 (1974), on remand, 391 F. Supp. 578 (1975); from tax laws, see
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proved elusive,59 while the inquiry into religious sincerity has
itself led to constitutional problems. 60 In United States v. Ballard,61 the Court stated that any inquiry into the reasonable62
ness of religious beliefs was constitutionally impermissible,
and that the only inquiry allowed is whether the claimant's
religious beliefs are sincerely held.63 The sincerity test illustrates the difficulty of defining religion. It is unclear, for example, whether sincerity should be determined by the length of
time the claimant has held his or her beliefs64 or by the various
United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1977); from mental examinations, see In re Marriage of Gove, 117 Ariz. 324, 572 P.2d 458 (Ct. App. 1977); from
unemployment compensation requirements, see Levold v. Employment Sec.
Dep't, 24 Wash. App. 472, 604 P.2d 175 (1979); and military service, see United
States v. Parker, 307 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1962), vacated, 372 U.S. 608 (1963).
59. For a catalogue of articles that have attempted to define religion under
the religion clauses, see Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1056 n.5 (1978). More recent articles that discuss definitions of religion include Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the FirstAmendmen4 45 U. CHL L. REV.
805, 829-42 (1978); Note, supra note 51, at 1478-79; Note, supra note 11, at 362-65.
Even if the approach suggested in this Article were adopted, problems in
defining religion might still occur in establishment clause cases. See Malnak v.
Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (1979). Inquiry into the sincerity of one's religious beliefs
would also be present in cases involving statutory grants of religious exemption. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
60. Defining religion is inextricably related to the establishment clause
and equal protection problems mentioned earlier. See generally Weiss, supra
note 21, at 604 (defining religion may be impossible and attempts at definition
may violate the establishment clause); Note, Defining Religion: Of God, the
Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHL L. REV. 533, 558 (1965) (any definition
must avoid violating the first amendment, as by favoring some religions over
others, and the fifth amendment, as by arbitrarily discriminating against some
religions); Comment, The Legal Relationship of Conscience to Religion: Refusals to Bear Arms, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 583 (1971) (criticizing sincerity test for
religion).
61. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
62. Accord Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972).
63. Ballard involved the trial of leaders of the "I Am" Movement for mail
fraud. The defendants allegedly falsely represented divine revelations and supernatural powers in an attempt to gain adherents and money. 322 U.S. at 79.
At trial, the judge, realizing that the truth of the defendants' beliefs could not
be submitted to the jury as an issue, instead framed the issue as whether the
defendants made their representations in good faith. Id. at 81. The Supreme
Court sanctioned this approach, and reaffirmed the principle that the verity of
one's religious beliefs is not open to question. Id. at 86.
64. See Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (private school policy against integration
was formulated "closely on the heels" of public school integration); United
States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808, 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960)
(conversion to Jehovah's Witnesses religion just prior to scheduled induction
into armed forces); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D. Iowa 1974),
afd sub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1975) (religious conversion of "recent vintage" was an inconclusive factor in assessing sincerity).
See also R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 150.
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methods the claimant uses to express those beliefs.65 If judges
choose to test sincerity by examining religious practices, the result is bound to favor orthodox religions with standard rituals
of worship over the less orthodox believers whose worship is
less ritualized or less observable.66 The defects of testing for
65. See R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 150. For instance, must the claimant's
practices be recognized as central to his religion? Centrality is a concept that
has been closely linked to the sincerity inquiry. Tribe has described centrality
as "the element of how central or essential to the religion is the practice affected by the prohibition or requirement." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST1rIONAL
LAw § 14-11, at 862 (1978).
The Supreme Court first raised the centrality principle in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), although it is questionable whether the Court there intended to promote centrality as a concept. In Sherbert, the Court mentioned
that the Seventh-Day Adventist unemployment compensation claimant refused
to work on Saturdays because doing so would violate "a cardinal principle of
her religious faith." Id. at 406. Seizing on this language, the California Supreme
Court announced the concept of centrality in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). In Woody, the court held that statutes proscribing the use of peyote could not be constitutionally applied to Navaho Indians because use of peyote was central to religious ceremonies of their church.
A long line of cases involving similar claims, put forth by more idiosyncratic defendants, have been rejected by distinguishing Woody on grounds of centrality.
See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (marijuana not central to practice of Hinduism); People v. Crawford, 69 Misc. 500, 508, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747, 755 (1972), af'd, 72 Misc. 2d
1021, 340 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (use of LSD and marijuana not central to church of
Missionaries of the New Truth); People v. Collins, 273 Cal. App. 2d 486, 487, 78
Cal. Rptr. 151, 152 (1969) (marijuana not indispensable to religion, but merely
constituted an artificial means to intensify communications with Supreme
Being).
Centrality was rejected as a free exercise requirement, however, in Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, the Court held that a Jehovah's
Witness could not be denied unemployment compensation for refusing to work
in an armaments factory in contravention of his religious conscience. In denying the petitioner's claim, the Indiana Supreme Court had found it significant
that another Jehovah's Witness had no religious objection to working in the
factory, and thus described the claimant's belief as a "personal philosophical
choice rather than a religious choice." Thomas v. Review Bd., - Ind. -, 391
N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (1979) (quoted in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. at 714). The
United States Supreme Court disagreed with the legal significance of that finding, reasoning as follows:
One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the
Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and the guarantee
offree exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the
members of a religious sect
450 U.S. at 715-16 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the claimant
had terminated his position for religious reasons. Id. at 716. The significant
fact for free exercise purposes, therefore, was that Thomas's actions were religiously motivated, and it did not matter whether producing tank turrets was central to his Jehovah's Witness religion.
66. In his dissent in Ballard, Justice Jackson observed that "any inquiry
into intellectual honesty in religion raises profound psychological problems
....
When one comes to trial which turns on any aspect of religious belief or
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sincerity of religious beliefs would not be obviated by accepting
the claimant's word. A mere assertion of sincerity, without
proof, would make the exemption available to anyone who
67
chose to claim it, the unscrupulous as well as the scrupulous.
Because of these difficulties within free exercise jurisprudence, the free exercise clause has received considerable attention from various commentators. 68 The literature that focuses
on the free exercise problem, however, tends to ignore the free
speech clause despite the fact that the two clauses may be in69
extricably bound.
representation, unbelievers among his judges are likely not to understand and
are almost certain not to believe him." 322 U.S. at 93. Of course, the less orthodox or familiar the religion, the less likely it is to be understood and believed
by the trier of fact.
The Court has never been comfortable with adjudicating the sincerity of
religious beliefs. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), is illustrative. "[A] state-conducted inquiry into the
sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs [is] a practice which a state might
believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious
guarantees." Id. at 609 (footnote omitted). In a similar vein, the practical limitations of the sincerity test were recognized by Justice Marshall in a conscientious objector case, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971):
The particular complaint about the war may itself be "sincere," but it is
difficult to know how to judge the "sincerity" of the objector's conclusion that the war in toto is unjust and that any personal involvement
would contravene conscience and religion. To be sure we have ruled
...that "the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question"; rather, the
question is whether the objector's beliefs are '"tuly held." But we
must also recognize that "sincerity" is a concept that can bear only so
much adjudicative weight.
Id. at 457 (citations omitted). See also R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 152 (examining religious practices to determine sincerity would result in discrimination
against unorthodox believers, ".. . just the sort of person whose behavior the
free-exercise is presumably being expanded to protect").
67. In the words of Tribe, "a showing [of sincerity] is necessary if the concept of required accommodation [of religious practices] is not to become a limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted legal obligations." I TRmE, supra note
65, § 14-11, at 859 (footnotes omitted).
68. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling The Conflict; 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1980); Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free
Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1969); Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Cour 68 CAl.. I REV. 422 (1980); Kurland, supra note 17;
Merel, supra note 59; Pfeffer, supra note 47; Weiss, supra note 21; Note, supra
note 11.
69. See Clark, supra note 68, at 336 (justifications for religious freedom duplicate those for freedom of speech); Merel, supra note 59, at 816, 820-22 (free
exercise right is coexistent with free speech right).
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WIDMAR v. VINCENT: DEVELOPING A DOCTRINAL
UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS
EXPRESSION

In Widmar v. Vincent,7 0 the Court provided the foundation
for a doctrinally sound analysis of the interrelationship between the free exercise and free speech clauses of the first
amendment. In addition, the Court may have unknowingly
planted the seeds for developing a way to avoid the problems of
judicially created religious exemptions based on the free exer71
cise clause that began with Sherbertv. Verner.
On its face, Widmar was not a difficult case. A student religious group, Cornerstone, was denied permission to conduct its
meetings in university buildings. Cornerstone's meetings consisted of prayers, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of
religious views and experiences. The university based its denial on its regulation which prohibited the use of university
grounds and buildings for religious worship or religious teaching.7 2 Because the university's buildings were available for
meetings of nonreligious organizations, the Court found the
challenged regulation was a classic example of a content based
regulation of freedom of speech, and therefore supportable
only by a "compelling" state interest.7 3 The university's as70. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
72. The university excluded religious groups from using campus facilities
after the university's Board of Curators adopted a regulation in 1972 prohibiting
prayer and religious worship, "a policy required, in the opinion of the Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State ...
." 454 U.S. at 266 n.3.
73. A compelling state interest in public, elementary and secondary school
cases may be the first amendment's anti-establishment mandate. See, e.g.,
Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1981), affld, 102 S. Ct. 1267
(1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978-80 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981); Wiley v. Franklin, 497 F. Supp. 390, 396 (E.D. Tenn.
1980). Cf.Colins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763-64 (9th Cir.
1981).
In Brandon, the Second Circuit held that the establishment clause served
as a compelling state interest sufficient to override the free speech and free exercise rights of students who had asked permission to hold prayer sessions at
their high school before classes began each day. The court found there was no
constitutional right to prayer on a high school campus, and the Supreme Court
denied review shortly after deciding Widmar v. Vincent. The Brandon court
stated, with respect to the students' free speech claim, that a high school is not
a public forum and although political views can be expressed in a public school,
the establishment clause served as a limitation on the right to air religious
views on campus. 635 F.2d at 980.
In Treen, an establishment clause violation was found when a state statute
allowed a teacher to ask if any student wanted to pray to begin the class and if
there were no volunteers, the teacher was permitted to pray for no longer than
five minutes. Students not wishing to participate were excused. 653 F.2d at 899.
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serted compelling interest, that the establishment clause mandated the regulation, was found unpersuasive. 74
One might have thought that because prayer was at issue
in Widmar, the Court would have grounded its opinion on free
exercise doctrine. The intriguing aspect of the Court's holding,
however, was that the case was decided according to a free
speech analysis. First, free exercise would have been a narrower basis for decision. Second, the Court was faced with the
argument that a holding on speech grounds would intrude on
matters protected by free exercise. The university had maintained "that something is either within the reference" of the
speech clause. 75
freedom of religion clause or the freedom7 of
6
The Court squarely rejected this argument.
Justice White dissented. According to White, if "religious
worship qua speech is not different from any other variety of
protected speech as a matter of constitutional principle ... the

Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form
of speech." 77 The majority apparently was quite willing to take
78
this step.
The implications of Widmar are potentially significant. BeSimilarly, in Wiley, the court held that Bible study classes violated the estab-

lishment clause. 497 F. Supp. at 396.
In Collins, a high school parent charged that a school district violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 when it permitted assemblies to begin with a communal prayer.
School officials were enjoined against the practice on establishment grounds.
644 F.2d at 762-64.
74. 454 U.S. at 270-75. The Court state& "The question is not whether the
creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and the question is
whether it can now exclude groups because of the content of their speech." Id.
at 273. Any benefit accruing to the religious group through use of university facilities would be merely incidental and would not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Id75. Brief for Appellant, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
76. 454 U.S. at 269-70 n.6.
77. Id. at 284 (White, J., dissenting).
78. Indeed, the Court may have foreseen that despite the Widmar holding,
it could still constitutionally prohibit prayer from the classroom because the establishment clause ban against state promotion of religion constitutes a compelling state interest. See supra note 73. As Justice White noted, the Widmar
holding would sooner or later force the Court to reconsider such cases as
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) and Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), which prohibited prayer (religious speech) from the
classroom. 454 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that
prohibiting prayer in the schools on free exercise grounds would depend on a
content based distinction between religious speech and other forms of speech,
while under Widmar, religious speech is not distinguishable for purposes of
free speech analysis. Id.
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cause few activities are more profoundly religious than prayer,
Widmar suggests that there is no core religious activity exclusively protected by the free exercise clause. Moreover, by relying on equal protection cases such as Carey v. BroUn 79 and
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 80 the Court implied8 1
that the religious aspects of the litigant's speech in Widmar
would be constitutionally irrelevant to the litigant's claim.
After Widmar, religious, speech is speech-no more, no less.
For example, if in Widmar there been no right of access to university buildings for groups engaging in nonreligious speech,
there would be no right of access for those engaging in reli82
gious speech.
Widmar thus leaves open significant questions with respect to free exercise jurisprudence. Does the free exercise
clause protect matters other than those protected under the
right of expression? Does the assertion of a free exercise right
add weight to a claim that already involves the right of expression? The discussion that follows attempts to answer each of
these concerns.
79. 477 U.S. 455 (1980) (cited in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270).
80. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (cited in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276).
81. Both Carey and Mosley presented challenges to ordinances which excepted labor picketing from a general ban on picketing in prescribed areas. In
support of the ordinances, it was argued that in the prescribed areas labor picketing was more appropriate than other types of picketing. See 447 U.S. at 46768; 408 U.S. at 100. In both cases, the Court rejected these challenges, reasoning
that there is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and thus selective exclusions from a public forum amount to impermissible censorship. See 447 U.S.
at 463; 408 U.S. at 96. For a thorough examination of the Supreme Court decisions dealing with content based regulations, see generally Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. LJ. 727
(1980); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The PeculiarCase
of Subject-MatterRestrictions,46 U. CH. L. REV. 81 (1978).
82. See infra notes 170-202 and accompanying text. But see Brandon v.
Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981).
The Brandon court affirmed a high school administration's denial of a student
group's request to hold prayer sessions on campus, holding that the establishment clause served as a compelling state interest sufficient to override any infringement of the students' free speech rights. 635 F.2d at 980. The student
group had argued that they merely sought "to exercise their rights to free
speech in a public forum, unencumbered by governmental regulation of the
context of their 'speech."' Id. The court responded, "While students have
First Amendment rights to political speech in public schools, sensitive Establishment Clause considerations limit their right to air religious doctrines." Id.
(citations omitted). Distinguishing the lower court's opinion in Widmar, which
was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Brandon court found that although religious speech could not be prohibited in a public forum, a high
school was not a public forum. Id.
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RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS EXPRESSION

The free exercise clause protects three kinds of individual
freedoms: freedom to engage in specific activities for religious
purposes,8 3 freedom to forego otherwise compulsory activities
because of religious conscience, 84 and freedom of belief. 85 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has held that, to some extent,
all of these freedoms come within the ambit of freedom of expression.86 The last freedom requires little additional discussion. Freedom of belief has consistently been held to be
87
protected by both the free speech and free exercise clauses.
The first two freedoms, however, require further analysis.

A.

THE FREEDOM TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES FOR
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES

Widmar v. Vincent8 8 held that prayer is speech under the
83. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640 (1981) (free exercise protects right to proselytize); McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618 (1978) (free exercise protects freedom to engage in religious
activities).
84. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religious exemption
from compulsory education); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (religious conscience basis for exemption from compulsory military service laws);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (exemption from state unemployment
compensation law due to religious objection to sabbath work). But see United
States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982) (no exemption from social security taxes
where religious conscience prohibited receipt or payment of taxes). See generally Clark, supra note 68, at 336-44 (one value underlying the free exercise
clause is protection of religious conscience); Laycock, supra note 14, at 1388-90
(conscientious objection to government policy protected by free exercise
clause); Merel, supra note 59, at 811 (free exercise clause provides special protection for religious conscience).
85. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (free exercise protects absolute freedom to believe).
86. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (freedom of expression
protects right to pray); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (broad freedom
of thought protected by first amendment); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (freedom of expression prevents state imposition of
affirmation of belief through compulsory flag salute).
87. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 n.7 (1978); West Va. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943). Justice Jackson stated in Barnette that a
Jehovah's Witness's refusal to salute the flag because of religious belief was
protected under the free speech clause. The free speech clause prohibited the
government's coercion of an individual's affirmation of belief, regardless of
whether the belief was motivated by religion or other concerns. Id. Similarly,
in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Court invalidated a New Hampshire statute requiring a Jehovah's Witness to carry the message "Live Free or
Die" on the license plate of his automobile. The Court reasoned that free
speech protected against the compelled affirmation of belief. Id. at 715, 717. But
cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (one who believes in violent overthrow of government may not hold union office).
88. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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first amendment. This result is not very surprising the
Supreme Court has long recognized that a religious motivation
for an activity does not automatically transfer the activity from
the protections of the free speech clause into the exclusive domain of the free exercise clause. Indeed, beginning in 1938, a
flurry of Supreme Court cases involving the religious activities
of Jehovah's Witnesses, including solicitation, proselytizing,
sales of religious literature, religious meetings and preaching,
were decided on free speech grounds. 89 True, in an occasional
case such as Follett v. McCormick,90 the Court indicated, or at
least hinted, that religious speech should be singled out for
peculiar first amendment treatment. 91 Nonetheless, one may
say fairly that the Jehovah's Witnesses cases established a wall
of protection for the dissemination of ideas, of which religious
ideas were just one variety.
That the vast majority of these cases were decided on
grounds of free speech rather than freedom of religion is strong
evidence that religious speech was accorded no special status.
The Court apparently was concerned with protecting the activities because of their speech element rather than their religious
elements. 92 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 93 the first successful first
amendment challenge brought by the Jehovah's Witnesses, laid
89. For a comparison of the Court's utilization of the free speech clause to
that of the free exercise clause in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, see Kurland,
Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHL IL REv. 2, 36-62 (1961);
Pfeffer, supra note 47, at 1124-26.
90. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
91. Follett involved a general tax imposed by a local government on the
sale of books. The majority held that the tax could not be applied to a Jehovah's Witness who distributed religious materials from door to door in exchange for contributions. The Court reasoned that to do so would tax the
exercise of religion. Id. at 578. Even at this early date, granting a religious exemption from an otherwise valid law was viewed by some as creating a tension
between the free exercise and establishment clauses. The dissenters in Follett
argued that an exemption only for religious book sellers subsidized religion.
Id. at 580-83 (Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting). Although the
Follett dissent did not explicitly characterize its objection as an establishment
clause concern, as did Justice Stewart nineteen years later in his concurring
opinion in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413-17 (1963), the language is unmistakable: "In effect the decision grants not free exercise of religion, in the sense
that such exercise shall not be hindered or limited, but, on the other hand, requires that the exercise of religion be subsidized." 321 U.S. at 581. The dissent
also recognized the constitutional propriety of according parity to protection of
religious and secular speech: "We cannot ignore what this decision involves. If
the First Amendment grants immunity from taxation to the exercise of religion,
it must equally grant a similar exemption to those who speak and to the press."
Id. at 581-82.
92. Indeed, if the Court felt the religious elements were relevant, it should
have rested its decisions on the narrower grounds of free exercise.
93. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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the foundation for categorizing religious speech under a broad
free speech umbrella. After being convicted under ordinances
proscribing the distribution or sale of religious literature, the
defendant attacked the ordinances, claiming violations of free94
dom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.

The Court held that the ordinances infringed upon freedom of
speech and of the press, but found no particular significance in
the religious nature of the defendant's literature. The Court
stressed only that the challenged ordinances infringed upon
the dissemination of ideas. 95
In cases after Lovell, in which the first amendment claims
of Jehovah's Witnesses were rejected, the Court further implied that the religious content of speech is constitutionally insignificant. In Cox v. New Hampshire,96 sixty-eight Jehovah's
Witnesses were arrested for engaging in an "information
march" without first obtaining a parade permit as required by
local law. After extensive free speech analysis, the Court upheld the permit requirement as a reasonable time, place and
manner regulation.9 7 The freedom of worship argument was
dismissed perfunctorily as "beside the point."98 The Court provided a one sentence explanation: "No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is
shown, but only the exercise of local control over the use of
streets for parades and processions." 99 In other words, a
parade is a parade, and local authorities need not be concerned
that the marchers carry a religious banner.
In Martin v. Struthers,100 the Court also recognized the generic nature of speech, but in a more positive manner. A
proselytizing Jehovah's Witness had been convicted for distributing religious tracts door to door in violation of a ban on all
home solicitation. In overturning the conviction, the Court explained the importance of door to door solication to the free
dissemination of ideas, 0 1 and concluded: "Freedom to dis94. Id. at 448.
95. Id. at 451-52.
96. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
97. Id. at 576.
98. Id. at 578.
99. Id.
100. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
101. Once again the Court placed dissemination of religious and political
ideas in one broad speech categoryMany of our most widely established religious organizations have used
this method of disseminating their doctrines, and laboring groups have
used it in recruiting their members ....
Of course, as every person
acquainted with political life knows, door to door campaigning is one of
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tribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society
that ...

it must be fully preserved."1 02

In Saia v. New York, 103 the Court again turned its attention
to the nature of the activity in which the Jehovah's Witness
was engaged, rather than the religious content of his message.
The Jehovah's Witness in Saia had been convicted for failing to
obtain a permit for a loudspeaker he used to amplify his
preachings. His request for a permit had been refused because
of others' complaints about noise. The Court invalidated the
permit requirement as a standardless prior restraint.104 Justice
Douglas's majority opinion focused entirely on speech, expressing the concern that a standardless restraint on speech could
be used arbitrarily to inhibit political as well as religious
speech.105
In each of these cases, the Court focused on the nature of
the activity and the importance of the activity in the free dissemination of ideas; the religious nature of the activities was
only incidental.106 Even though the activities in question in
these cases were as integrally religious as preaching, worship,
and proselytizing, the Court did not suggest that these religious
components were significant, other than to show that through
these activities ideas were being expressed. Indeed, the Court
has never found an activity engaged in for religious purposes to
be entitled to protection under the free exercise clause when
that activity did not inhere with an aspect of expression.
This point was acknowledged by one of free exercise's most
the most accepted techniques of seeking popular support, while the circulation of nominating papers would be greatly handicapped if they
could not be taken to the citizens in their homes.
Id. at 145-46 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 146-47.
103. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
104. Id. at 559-60.
105. Justice Douglas stated:
Loud-speakers are today indispensable instruments of effective public
speech. The sound truck has become an accepted method of political
campaigning. It is the way people are reached. Must a candidate for
governor or the Congress depend on the whim or caprice of the Chief
of Police in order to use his sound truck for campaigning?
Id. at 561.
106. The Court's reasoning in Martinv. Struthers particularly illustrates the
irrelevance of the nature of the Jehovah's Witnesses' claims. See supra note
101. But see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishmen4 and DoctrinalDevelopment-Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381,
1397-98 (1967) (free exercise claim added weight to Jehovah's Witnesses'
claims).
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eminent defenders, Leo Pfeffer, who in reviewing the cases
prior to Sherbert stated:
The chronicle can be summed up briefly and starkly: In every case in
which a claim under the free exercise clause was upheld, it was bracketed with a free speech or free press claim; conversely, whenever free
exercise stood alone it was unsuccessful. Realistically, free exercise
did not have a separate but equal existence, or even one that was sepa10 7
rate and unequai- it practically had no existence at all

Because the cases after Sherbert which found a unique existence for the free exercise clause did not involve activities un-

dertaken for religious purposes, but the right to forego
otherwise

compulsory activities because

of religious

con-

science, 0 8 Professor Pfeffer's analysis remains valid. Apparently, affirmative activites undertaken for religious purposes

are protected only by rights of expression.
B.

THE FREEDOM TO FOREGO OTHERWISE COMPULSORY
ACTrrTIEs BECAUSE OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE

The pertinent area in which the speech and free exercise
clauses have not completely overlapped involves the right to
forego otherwise compulsory activities because of religious conscience. 10 9 The Court has never protected religious conscience
in all circumstances, however;" 0 and, when it has recognized
rights of religious conscience, it has been equivocal in deciding
whether religious conscience is to be protected by the religious
exercise clause or by the speech clause."' Occasionally, the
107. Pfeffer, supra note 47, at 1130. Professor Kurland, however, argues that
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), gave higher protection to religious literature than to other literature. P. KuRLAND, REuGION AND THE LAw 57
(1962).
108. See infra note 113.
109. As suggested earlier, the free exercise clause may have an independent
vitality with respect to rights of religious autonomy and protection of religious
exercise from nonneutral infringement. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (bigamy and polygamy
criminal although encouraged by Mormon church). See generally Giannella,
supra note 106.
111. In vindicating rights of conscience under the speech clause, the Court
has occasionally referred to the interest as one of freedom of mind. See Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158
(1944). Use of the term "freedom of mind" is somewhat unfortunate because of
its imprecision. Nonetheless, the phrase is useful as a shorthand expression of
the principles embodied in Wooley. "Freedom of mind" can be taken to mean
freedom from having the government compel people to express something they
do not believe in, even when they would not likely be identified as supporting
the message expressed. "Freedom of conscience" can be taken to mean freedom from having the government force people to do some things they feel are
deeply wrong. Thus, freedom of mind can be viewed as one kind of freedom of
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Court has preserved religious conscience on the grounds of secular rights of expression and association,112 while in other contexts it has assured religious conscience on the basis of free
exercise. 113 In addition, defining exactly what constitutes a
religious conscience has been obscured by cases in which litigants have advanced what appear to be rights of secular conscience and the Court has found those rights to be protected by
the free exercise clause." 4 Only three cases have sustained
challenges to laws of general applicability solely under the free
exercise clause on the ground that those laws violated the integrity of the litigant's religious beliefs."5
In sum, there is no question that both the free exercise and
free speech clauses have been found to protect religious conscience. This section explores that development by considering
contexts in which religious conscience has been treated as
speech and secular conscience has been given the status of
religion.
1. Religious Conscience as Speech
The Supreme Court has already recognized that the right
to forego an activity or to refrain from engaging in an otherwise
compulsory expressive activity because of religious principle is
protected under the free speech clause. Two of the flag salute
cases of the 1940's, Minersville School Districtv. Gobitis116 and
conscience. In this Article, the interest in foregoing activities because of conscientious objection will be described as freedom of conscience, regardless
whether that objection is based on religious or nonreligious concerns.
112. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (Jehovah's Witness's
refusal to display state motto "Live Free or Die" on his license plate for religious, moral, ethical and political reasons protected by free speech clause);
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (attack on compulsory flag salute requirement by Jehovah's Witness upheld on free speech
grounds).
113. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jehovah's Witness
granted exemption from unemployment compensation regulations because his
religious beliefs prevented him from working in an armaments factory); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish granted exemption from Wisconsin's compulsory education requirements on free exercise grounds); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise exemption to South Carolina's unemployment insurance program carved out for benefits claimant whose religion
forbids Saturday work).
114. See infra notes 132-61 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 113. It is interesting to note, however, that although the
Court's discussion in those cases focused on the religious concerns of the challengers' claims, rights of expression were arguably at stake. See infra notes
205-07 and accompanying text.
116. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,117 and
more recently, Wooley v. Maynard,118 provide lucid examples.
In Gobitis, Jehovah's Witnesses claimed that free exercise justified their children's refusal to salute the flag. Writing for the
majority, Justice Frankfurter rejected the free exercise claim,
reasoning that the school board's flag salute requirement did
not impose any religious belief upon the children." 9 Justice
Stone, in his famous dissent, advocated first amendment protection for a broad "freedom of thought" and argued that requiring a person to utter words which were profane to that
individual was the worst form of coercion of belief.120
Three years later in Barnette, the Court overruled Gobitis,
and came close to adopting Justice Stone's position when it invalidated an identical flag salute requirement on free speech
grounds. Jehovah's Witnesses had argued that free speech
should be construed to include the freedom not to speak utterances that were repugnant to the speaker.121 Although the Witnesses' objection to the flag salute requirement was based on
religion, the Court viewed the issue as protection of individual
freedom of conscience, regardless of whether the objection was
motivated by religious or other conscientiously held beliefs.122
The majority characterized compulsory flag salutes as involving
an "affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind,"123 and ex117. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
118.

430 U.S. 705 (1977).

119. 310 U.S. at 594.
120. Id. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting). One commentator said of Justice
Stone's dissent: "[Stone] sought to extend to religious freedom litigation the

circumstantial approach already in vogue in free speech cases. Beyond this, he
tried to establish an absolute immunity for what he considered the underlying
imperative of the First Amendment-freedom of thought in a broad sense." D.
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAEsAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CoNTRovERsY 147 (1962).
121. Brief for Appellees, West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943). The Jehovah's Witnesses' brief contained arguments based on both
freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Arguing that the case could be decided on free speech grounds, counsel stated that the first amendment freedoms should receive equal treatment. He also argued that free speech should
be construed to include the freedom not to speak repugnant utterances. For a
discussion of all five briefs filed in the case, see D. MLANWARING, supra note 120,
at 215.

122. The Court stated:
Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular
religious views or the sincerity with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees' motive for enduring the discomforts of making
the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious
views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe the constitutional liberty
of the individual.
319 U.S. at 634-35 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 633.
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plained: "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment...
to reserve from all official control."' 24
As one author noted, Gobitis and Barnette may be construed as recognizing that freedom of religion and speech are
"related parts of a sort of political 'freedom of conscience.'"125
These two cases also demonstrate that a refusal to engage in a
compulsory speech activity because of religious conscience is a
free speech claim requiring no independent free exercise
analysis.
The cases construing freedom of conscience, including religious conscience, as protected by the speech clause, coalesced
in Wooley v. Maynard.126 One of the claimants, George Maynard, had covered up the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on his
license plates, because the motto conflicted with his moral, ethical, political, and religious beliefs.127 After being convicted
three times for defacing his license plates in violation of state
law, Maynard sought to enjoin the enforcement of the statute.
The Court found that Maynard had not intended to convey any
ideas by refusing to display the motto on his license plate, but
characterized the case as one involving a right of nonspeech,' 28
the right not to say "Live Free or Die," and invalidated the
statute.
The Court could have chosen to base its decision on the
free exercise clause. After all, one of Maynard's arguments was
that his religious freedom was infringed by the statute.129 Instead, the Court held that compelling a person to become a vehicle for expressing a belief he or she finds objectionable
invades a "sphere of intellect and spirit" 3 0 protected by rights
124. Id. at 642.
125.

D. MANwARiNG, supra note 120, at 54-55.

126. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
127. The Court recognized that the essence of Maynard's objections was
that he found the message conveyed by the motto "Live Free or Die" "morally,
ethically, religiously and politically abhorent." Id. at 713.
128. 'We begin with the proposition that the freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Id. at 714 (emphasis
added).
129. See supra note 127.
130. Id. at 717. The Court stated.
[W]e are faced with a state measure which forces an individual
... to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State "invades the
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of expression. In effect, the Wooley case established a "right of
conscience."131
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."
Id. at 715 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
131. The Court alluded to this in Wooley: "The right to speak and the right
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind." 430 U.S. at 714. See supra note 111. Explaining Wooley as resting on a purported alternative ground, specifically the
right of non-speech, is attenuated. Maynard was no more forced to say "Live
Free or Die" by having that motto on his license plate than an individual is
forced to say "In God We Trust" every time he makes a cash purchase. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, if Maynard was concerned with persons ascribing
the quote "Live Free or Die" to him, all he needed to do was indicate by
bumper sticker or some other means that he did not subscribe to the state
motto. See 430 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Describing Wooley as an expression case involving a right of nonspeech is
even more difficult after PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980). In PruneYard,the Court held, based on the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of state constitutionally protected rights of free expression and
petition, that the state of California could require a shopping center owner to
permit members of the public to use shopping center property as a forum for
speech. Id. at 88. Justice Rehnquist, this time writing for the majority, attempted to distinguish Wooley on several grounds. Initially, he observed that
the shopping center was not limited to the personal use of the owners as was
the automobile that carried the state-mandated message in Wooley. Consequently, the views expressed by members of the public while speaking or distributing pamphlets would not likely be identified as those of the shopping
center owners. In addition, he pointed out that California, unlike New Hampshire in Wooley, was not prescribing a specific message; the state was only requiring that others be able to disseminate whatever message they might have.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist noted that the shopping center owners could publicly disavow any identification with the messages of speakers or pamphleteers
by posting signs. Id. at 87.
These attempts to distinguish Wooley undercut Wooley as a case involving
expression identifiable with the challengers, and hence as a case implicating a
right of nonspeech. Justice Rehnquist's claim that the shopping center owners
could readily disclaim sponsorship of any views expressed at the facility is
hardly a ground to distinguish Wooley. In fact, the argument is the same one
Rehnquist relied on in his Wooley dissent to find the absence of any compelled
expression in that case. See 430 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rather
than distinguishing Wooley, the argument merely highlights what Justice
Rehnqulst perceived to be wrong with the Wooley majority's position in the
first place: that automobile owners were not being compelled to express any
particular message as long as they were capable of dissociating themselves
from the message on the license plates. Id. at 720-22. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist's observation that because a shopping center is an establishment open to
the public its owners will not be identified with the views expressed by members of the public who use it as a forum for speech also fails to distinguish
PruneYard from Wooley. People are no more likely to believe that an automobile owner avows the message connected with a state's license plate motto than
to believe that a shopping center owner sponsors the message of speakers or
pamphleteers who use the shopping center facility. Finally, Justice Rehnquist's other ground for distinguishing the cases, that in Wooley the government itself prescribed the message, is useful only if people actually associated
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Wooley and Barnette do not stand alone in establishing
that the free exercise clause is not the exclusive guardian for
rights of conscience. In three recent cases, the Court has extended a first amendment protection of conscience in wholly
32
secular contexts. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,1
the Court relied on the first amendment to strike down a state
law which required nonunion public employees to contribute,
as a condition of employment, to union political activities they
opposed. 3 3 The Court held that this requirement violated the
first amendment, although no claims of religious objection were
involved. 34 The Court stated: "[Alt the heart of the First
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to
believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should
be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced
35
by the state.'
Of similar effect are Elrod v. Burns 3 6 and Branti v. Finkel. 3 7 In Elrod, Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, held
that a newly elected Democratic sheriff of Cook County had violated the constitutional rights of certain non-civil service employees by discharging them because they were not members
the government's message with the automobile owner in Wooley and the
speaker's or pamphleteer's message with the shopping center owner in
PruneYard. But because the cases are nearly indistinguishable on free expression grounds-in both cases, either the public would not initially ascribe the
messages to the owner of the automobile or to the owner of the shopping
center, or the owners could easily dissociate themselves from the messagesthe content of the expression involved cannot be used as a justification to differentiate them.
PruneYard thus requires that Wooley be read as something other than an
expression case involving a right of nonspeech, because in both cases it is unclear whether the objectors were actually identified as expressing anything. In
light of PruneYard, Wooley stands for the proposition that freedom of expression also protects a right to be free from governmental attempts to coerce beliefs by forcing individuals to express a message they do not believe in, even
when others could not generally view them as identifying with that message.
In short, these cases establish a sort of "freedom of mind." See supra note 111.
132. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
133. Id. at 234-36. The Court pointedly distinguished Railway Employes'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), which upheld a union shop clause that required financial support of the union's exclusive bargaining representative by
its members. 431 U.S. at 215, 219. Hanson did not deal with the issue of
whether members could be forced to contribute union dues used for ideological
purposes. Id. at 219.
134. 431 U.S. at 234-35.
135. Id. Significantly, the Court remarked that the same "principles prohibit a State from compelling any individual to affirm his belief in God," and
cited Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), a case decided on free exercise
grounds. Again, the merger of the speech and free exercise clauses is evident.
136. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
137. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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of the Democratic Party.138 Noting that in order to retain their
jobs, the sheriff's employees were required to pledge their allegiance to the Democratic Party, Justice Brennan concluded
that the system inevitably tended to coerce employees into
compromising their true political beliefs.139 Citing, of all cases,
Sherbert v. Verner,140 the Court held that Cook County's patronage practice impermissibly conditioned a governmental
privilege or benefit on protected activity in violation of the first
amendment. 141
More recently, in Branti v. Finkel,142 the Court held that a
newly appointed public defender could not dismiss two assistant defenders on the sole ground of their political beliefs.S43
Again, the protection of a person's right not to compromise his
or her beliefs, the archetypal right of conscience, was found to
implicate rights of expression.144
It is not submitted that cases such as Wooley and Abood
establish a generalized right of conscience. 14 5 Specifically, the
138. 427 U.S. at 373. The defendants argued that the interest in patronage
dismissals outweighed the first amendment values at stake. Id. at 363-73. The
Court found the interests asserted insufficient, except to the extent that the interest in implementing policies sanctioned by the electorate justified patronage
dismissals in policymaking positions. Id. at 372.
139. Id. at 357-60. Two cases were cited as "[p]articularly pertinent" in construing the first amendment freedom of political association as applied to patronage dismissals: Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Keyishian held unconstitutional statutes prohibiting public employment of members of subversive organizations.
140. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
141. 427 U.S. at 373.
142. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
143. Id. at 519-20. The defendant attempted to characterize the role of assistant public defender as a policymaking position, fitting the patronage dismissal
exception articulated by the plurality in Elrod. See supra note 138. This argument was rejected. The Court viewed the responsibility of an assistant public
defender as implicating individual attorney-client relationships rather than a
broad political policy function. 445 U.S. at 517-20.
144. 445 U.S. at at 513-17. In Branti, unlike Elrod, the party in power did not
exact a "pledge of allegiance" in order to retain the job, but instead required
that an employee be "sponsored" by the party. Id. at 512, 516-17. The defendants argued unsuccessfully that sponsorship involved a lesser degree of coercion than a switch in political affiliation, and thus encroached on first
amendment values to a lesser degree. Id. at 516. The Court found this distinction unpersuasive, and stated that although sponsorship is a less blatant form
of political coercion, it nonetheless falls within the first amendment proscription forbidding "the dismissal of a public employee solely because of his private political beliefs." Id. at 516-17.
145. The framers of the Constitution considered including explicit language
in the first amendment to guarantee freedom of conscience. Several such proposals were submitted by various representatives to the Constitutional Convention. Congressman Livermore suggested. "Congress shall make no laws
touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience." 1 ANNALs OF CON-
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Court has drawn the line for protecting secular conscience at
the point where the objection stems from a desire to refrain
from what might be termed a governmental attempt at coercing
beliefs. In other words, the Court has established a sort of
"freedom of mind" -- 14 6 a concept which, as will be shown, is
not far removed from what has been accorded protection as

religious conscience.147
2.

Secular Conscience as Religion

While the Supreme Court has been using definitions of
speech to include expressive religious activities and rights of
religious conscience, numerous cases suggest that the definition of religious exercise may include what are commonly regarded as more secular concerns. In two separate cases, for
example, the Court has suggested, without discussion, that secular humanism is religion under the first amendment.14 The
more important case is Torcaso v. Watkins,149 which expanded
the free exercise clause to include nontheistic beliefs.15o In
Torcaso, the Court struck down a requirement that a notary
public appointee profess his or her belief in God as a prerequiAmes similarly proposed: "Congress
shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof,
or to infringe the rights of conscience." Id. at 766. A framer of the Bill of
Rights, James Madison, earlier placed for consideration before the House:
"[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 729. One legal scholar has concluded that the first
amendment as written in the Constitution fully embodies the intent of the
framers to protect the right of conscience, and the final wording which lacks explicit language protecting conscience signifies merely a change in form, not
content. See Freeman, A Remonstrancefor Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806,
812-13 (1958).
Further, it has been suggested that, by stating a right of conscience separately from free exercise and disestablishment of religion, the framers implicated a right of conscience independent of religious conscience. See Comment,
supra note 60, at 585 n.13.
146. See supra notes 111, 131.
147. See infra notes 203-19 and acompanying text.
148. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357 n.8 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
149. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
150. Earlier, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court had
stated: "Neither [a state nor the federal government] can force nor influence a
person to go or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs." Id. at 15-16 (emphasis
added). Although this passage indicates that the Court recognized early in free
exercise clause case history that disbelief in religion would be constitutionally
protected, it did not directly consider the question until Torcaso. See 367 U.S.
at 495.
GREss 731 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
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site to receiving his or her commission.151 Holding that this requirement violated a person's right of nonbelief, the Court
stated that this right was protected under the free exercise
52
clause.1
In the conscientious objector cases following Torcaso, the
Court expanded the meaning of religion as it was used in section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967153 to include beliefs that were clearly secular in nature.15 4 Although
the Court's interpretation of religion was in a statutory context,
the cases illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing religious
55
the apfrom secular conscience. In Welsh v. United States,1
plicant for conscientious exemption status clearly noted that in
his view the beliefs that entitled him to come within the religious exemption were not religious.l 5 6 Despite Welsh's protestations, the Court held that his beliefs were religious even
57
though they were neither theistic nor atheistic in nature.1
151. 367 U.S. at 496.
152. Id. Torcaso had also contended that article VI of the Constitution,
which provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States," applied to the states. Id.
at 489 n.l. The Court found it unnecessary to decide this question, as the religious oath requirement was invalidated on free exercise grounds. Id.
153. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
154. See generally Meiklejohn, Conscientious Objection in the Supreme
Court: Welsh and Gillette, 8 CUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Norman, The Selective Conscience, 11 DuQ. L. REv. 338 (1973); Paris, Toward an Understanding of the
Supreme Court's Approach to Religion in Conscientious Objector Cases, 7 SUFFOLK U. L REV. 449 (1973); Silva, The Constitution, the Conscientious Objector,
and the "Just"War, 75 DicK. L. REv. 1 (1970); Comment, supra note 60.
155. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
156. Id. at 353 n.7 (Harlan, J., concurring). Welsh denied that his objection
to the war was religiously based. Instead, he asserted that his beliefs derived
from "sociological, economic, historical, and philosophical considerations."
Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081-82 (1968). A letter Welsh wrote to his
local draft board exemplifies the foundations for his stand against the war.
I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see that
the military complex wastes both human and material resources, that
it fosters disregard for (what I consider a paramount concern) human
needs and ends; I see that the means we employ to "defend" our "way
of life" profoundly change that way of life. I see that in our failure to
recognize the political, social, and economic realities of the world, we,
as a nation, fail our responsibility as a nation.
398 U.S. at 342 (emphasis in original).
Apparently anticipating that there might be some difficulty in defining his
beliefs as religious, Welsh argued in the alternative that the exemption accorded religious believers violated the establishment clause. The majority of
the Court did not consider this argument. See 398 U.S. at 368 (White, J., dissenting). The majority's inclusion of Welsh's beliefs under its definition of religion led Justice Harlan to describe the definition as "Newspeak." Id. at 353 n.7
(Harlan, J., concurring).
157. Welsh's 'religion" was based on his moral and ethical precepts. 398
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Most recently, the Court decided in Thomas v. Review
Board158 that a Jehovah's Witness's claim that he could not
work in an armaments factory was protected by the free exercise clause.159 The Court reached this conclusion even though
the claimant himself could not articulate the nature of his religious objections and the Indiana Supreme Court found that his
objection was personal and philosophical rather than religiously based. 160 In fact, some of the testimony in the case indicated that the plaintiff's religion did not require his absence
from the armaments factory.161
3. Summary
These cases illustrate the Supreme Court's confusion when
deciding issues of religious free exercise and rights of conscience. It is not clear, for example, why the right not to believe in religious values is construed as a religious right162
while the right not to engage in a flag salute because of religious conscience is construed as a right of expression. 63 In
any event, two major points may be gathered from these cases.
First, whether an activity is protected as free expression, free
exercise, or both is not critical to the Court's analysis. Second,
the cases establish that no element of religious activity, includU.S. at 341-43. The Welsh majority's definition of religion has been analyzed by
some commentators. See, e.g., Paris, supra note 154.
158. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
159. Id. at 719.
160. See Thomas v. Review Bd., - Inl. -, 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (1979). The
Indiana Supreme Court had given weight to Thomas's testimony that although
he objected to working directly in the production of tanks, he admittedly did
not object to working on raw products necessary for the production of tanks.
See 391 N.E.2d at 1131 (quoted in 450 U.S. at 715). In fact, Thomas earlier had
worked on the raw product in the same armaments factory. 450 U.S. at 710. To
this the Supreme Court responded:
The [Indiana] court found this position inconsistent with Thomas'
stated opposition to participation in the production of armaments. But,
Thomas' statements reveal no more than that he found work in the roll
foundry sufficiently insulated from producing weapons of war. We see,
therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the
line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to
dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is "struggling" with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with
the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might
employ.
450 U.S. at 715.
161. The Indiana Supreme Court had found it significant that another Jehovah's Witness deemed it religiously acceptable to work in the factory. 391
N.E.2d at 1128-29, 1133. The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the
legal significance of that finding. See supra note 65.
162. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
163. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35, 642.
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ing religious conscience, is exclusively the domain of the free
exercise clause.164 Elements of religious belief, conscience, and
moral conviction are evident in Wooley,165 Widmar,166 Barnette,167 Torcaso,168 and Thomas,169 even though in the first
three cases the Court protected these elements as expression
while in the last two it protected the same elements as religious exercise. Thus, as in the religious activity cases, the
question remains whether a separate free exercise inquiry is
necessary or appropriate.
IV.

DEFINING THE SCOPE OF FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS

The previous section demonstrated the great extent to
which the Supreme Court is using freedom of expression analysis in cases involving religious liberty. Prayer, worship, and
religious conscience have all been protected as expression.
Merely establishing that the freedoms of speech and religion
overlap, however, does not end the inquiry. Two further questions remain. First, should the religious element in an expression case entitle the litigant to additional protection
unavailable to those presenting nonreligious expression
claims? This question is essentially one of degree, requiring an
assessment of whether the Constitution should provide greater
protection for religious matters than for nonreligious matters.
Second, should there be greater latitude in recognizing a protected interest when religious claims are presented than when
nonreligious claims are advanced? This question is one of definition, but is closely related to the first. In effect, it involves a
decision whether the Constitution should define claims entitled
to protection under the free exercise clause more broadly than
those protectable under the free expression clause.

A. REJECTING THE ARGUMENT FOR A MORE STRINGENT
PROTECTION FOR RELIGIOUS EXERCISE

In cases in which religious and expression interests overlap, it has been suggested that issues of religious freedom,
whether they be characterized as free exercise or as religious
expression, require more stringent and more diligent protec164. But see Merel, supra note 59, at 811 (free speech clause protects conscientious speech while free exercise clause protects religious conscience).
165. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).

166. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
167. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
168. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

169. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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tion. Explicit in this argument is the premise that there is an
- ordering of first amendment freedoms, and religious freedom is
70
supreme.1
The argument for free exercise supremacy was first
presented in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases of the 1930's and
1940's. In those cases, particular governmental actions were attacked as violating both free exercise and free speech.171 In no
case, however, did the Court vindicate a free exercise right
72
while simultaneously denying a free speech claim.'
170. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (freedom to practice one's religion enjoys the most preferred position).
Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(false representations of religious experience or belief should not be grounds
for criminal fraud conviction); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 621 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (free exercise is supreme), rev'd, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). See
also Pfeffer, supra note 47 (free exercise is the most favored first amendment
right).
There is nothing in the Constitution itself, however, that suggests the primacy of the free exercise clause, nor is there anything that can easily be garnered from the intent of the framers. As has been candidly admitted, the
history behind the religion clauses is hopelessly ambiguous in determining the
framers' intent. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated: "A too literal quest for the
advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for ... the historical record is at best ambiguous and
statements can readily be found to support either side of the proposition." Id.
See also Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 652-53 (1981) (religious peripatetic conduct accorded no higher protection
than other, nonreligious proselytizing); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
164 (1944) (all the first amendment freedoms have a preferred position and no
single freedom is supreme). But see Pfeffer, supra note 47 (Wisconsin v. Yoder
established the primacy of the free exercise clause).
171. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (loudspeaker permit requirement invalidated on free speech grounds where Jehovah's Witness used
loudspeaker for preaching); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (Jehovah's Witnesses claimed denial of right to refuse to salute the flag
violated both free exercise and free speech clauses); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941) (Jehovah's Witnesses' parading activities subject to free
speech analysis).
Most recently, both free speech and free exercise violations were alleged in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university regulation prohibiting use of
school facilities by student religious group held violative of free speech clause)
and in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (Jehovah's Witness claimed New
Hampshire regulation requiring display of state motto on all automobile license
plates violated free speech and free exercise liberties).
172. Free exercise claims, in fact, were given summary treatment in early
cases linking free exercise and free speech, free press and free assembly
claims. See, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943) (religious motivation of speaker given only brief mention by Court); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (free exercise claim involving cursing of public
officer summarily dismissed). See also Pfeffer, supra note 47, at 1124-30 (chronicling Court's treatment of early free exercise claims and concluding that free
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Prince v. Massachusetts17 3 dramatically illustrates this
point. In Prince, the Court was faced with a petitioner who acknowledged that she was entitled to no protection under the
free speech clause yet sought relief under the free exercise
clause.174 The Court rejected the claim of free exercise primacy in no uncertain terms, and indeed discussed the rights of
free speech and free exercise as embodying a unitary conception. The Court stated:
If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of
the great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher
place than the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme.
All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and
in the modes appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the
charter's prime place because they have unity in their human sources
and functionings. Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith and
reasoned judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But
in the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, these variant
ways.
aspects of personality find inseparable expression in a thousand
175
They cannot be altogether parted in law more than in life.

The Court recently reaffirmed this position in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,Inc. 17 6 In that:

case, the Court was faced with a challenge by a religious organization against a Minnesota State Fair rule that required literature distributions and solicitations to occur only at designated
booth spaces.' 7 ' The plaintiffs, the International Society for
exercise claims were upheld only where bracketed with free speech or free
press claims).
Moreover, recent cases also suggest that a free exercise claim would not
succeed where a free speech claim failed. The Court has rejected free speech
challenges to compulsory union dues where the union's political views contravened the contributor's views. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238
(1956). Cases rejecting free exercise challenges to similar statutes are consistently denied review by the Court. See, e.g., Hammond v. United Papermakers
Union, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1972); Gray v.
Gulf M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
Hammond, Linscott and Gray all involved claims by Seventh-Day Adventists
that being forced to join or contribute to labor unions violated their freedom of
religion. The claims were rejected. But see infra note 207 (suggesting that, to
the extent rights of expression were implicated in Yoder and Thomas and were
overlooked, the Court has indicated a preference for free exercise rights over
free speech rights).
173. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
174. Id. at 164. The case involved a Jehovah's Witness who had been convicted under a state child labor law when she allowed her niece to distribute
religious literature on the street. Id. at 159-60.
175. Id. at 164-65.
176. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
177. The religious group sought an exemption from a rule requiring all ex-
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Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), challenged this rule as violating both their free speech and religious exercise rights.178 It
was stipulated that peripatetic solicitation was part of ISKCON's religious ritual and required by their religious tenets.179
On this basis, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the ISKCON members could not be confined to a booth space and were
constitutionally entitled under free exercise to engage in peripatetic conduct. 180
On appeal before the United States
Supreme Court, however, ISKCON decided not to rest its claim
on the ruling of the Minnesota court, and instead sought relief
based solely on its asserted free speech rights.181 Nonetheless,
the Court discussed ISKCON's free exercise claim in its

opinion:
[ISKCONI and its ritual... have no special claim to First Amendment protection as compared to that of other religions who also distribute literature and solicit funds. None of our cases suggest that the
inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a church ritual entitles
church members to solicitation rights in a public forum superior to
those of members of other religious groups that raise money but do not
purport to ritualize the process. Nor for present purposes do religious
organizations enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on
the fair grounds superior to those of other organizations having social,
political, or other ideological messages to proselytize. These nonreligious organizations seeking support for their activities are entitled to
rights equal to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and
spread their2 views, whether by soliciting funds or by distributing
18
literature.

Thus, in Heffron, as in Prince, the Court refused to provide independent vitality to the free exercise claim when rights of expression were also involved.
In addition to the case law, sound policy arguments dictate
against according free exercise rights greater protection than
free speech rights. The free exercise clause generally performs
two separate functions. It protects individual liberty, 83 and it
hibitors attending the Minnesota State Fair to conduct sales or distributions of
written materials from a booth. Id. at 643-44.
178. Id. at 644-46.
179. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299
N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1980).
180. Id. at 85.
181. 452 U.S. at 647.
182. Id. at 652-53.
183. See Merel, supra note 59, at 810 (unifying principle underlying the religion clauses is that individual choices in matters of religion should remain
free). Various commentators have tried to express the rights or values implicit
in the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 68, at 336-37, 342 (in addition to the justifications for religious freedom that are duplicated by those for
freedom of speech, the free exercise clause promotes a healthy idealism and,
most important, protects people from the severe psychic turmoil that can be
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84
promotes a society that is enriched by cultural pluralism.
85
Both of these goals are also served by the free speech clause.1
The free speech clause, however, performs an additional function, well described by Professor Miekeljohn as the promotion
of the political process and the exchange of ideas necessary for
self-government.186 Religious exercise, in contrast, accomplishes no such purpose. In fact, the establishment clause may
be seen as an attempt by the framers to insure that the demo-

87
cratic process not be unduly influenced by religious values.1

This purpose was explicitly noted by the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.188 The language in Lemon is enlightening:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even parbrought about by compelled violations of conscience); Laycock, supra note 14,
at 1388-89 (the free exercise clause protects the freedom to carry on religious
activities, the right to carry on these activities autonomously through communal organizations, and the right to conscientiously object to government policy); Weiss, supra note 21, at 623 (religion is protected only in the realm of
belief or pure manifestations affecting belief); Note, supra note 59, at 1056, 1058
(core of the free exercise clause is the inviolability of conscience).
184. See Clark, supra note 68, at 337 (protection of religious or conscientious
values promotes valuable idealism); Note, supra note 59, at 1056, 1058 (free exercise clause promotes a desirable pluralism of thought). For a discussion of
the value of cultural pluralism underlying the free exercise clause, see Pfeffer,
supra note 47, at 1118-20.
185. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970) (values underlying system of freedom of expression are
individual self-fulfillment, advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth,
participation in decisionmaking by all members of society and achievement of
more adaptable and more stable community); Stone, supra note 81, at 104 (free
speech serves the values of enhancing individual autonomy and personal
growth and of facilitating intelligent self-government).
186. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 96 (1960); Meiklejohn, The
FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245. See also Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971);
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "CentralMeaning of the First
Amendment;" 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 208; Stone, supra note 81, at 101 n.101.
187. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J.); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also
Freund, Commen Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680, 1692
(1969). But see Gaffney, PoliticalDivisiveness Along Religious Lines: Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LouIs U.
L. J. 205, 224-34 (1980). Construing constitutional law based on a view of political divisiveness along religious lines, Professor Gaffney asserts, is inimical to
our concept of civil liberties. Gaffney also states that discouraging political participation, whether religiously motivated or otherwise, contravenes the right of
public discussion. Id. at 233-34. He concludes that in law the divisiveness test
has been "useless," as a statement of American values it is misguided, and
therefore that it should be shorn from constitutional thought before it causes
serious harm. Id. at 236.
188. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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tisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system
of government, but political division along religious lines was one of
the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to
protect ....
It conflicts with our whole history
the normal political process ....
and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume
such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could
divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront
The history of many countries attests
every level of government ....
to the hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena or political
power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of religious
189
beliefs.

One does not have to argue that religious involvement in
the political process is itself violative of the establishment
clause.190 But in light of the establishment clause's express
limitation on religious influence in government, and because
the Court has recognized no comparable limitation on expression, 191 it is difficult, if not untenable, to argue that religious exercise is the favored freedom.
A possible response might be that religious exercise can be
segregated from its political effects, and when so segregated
must be entitled to special protection. But such segregation is
simply impossible. Concepts such as equality, human rights,
and the quest for peace have political and religious overtones.
For example, the abortion issue, to some a profoundly religious
issue, is laden with political, social, and even economic overtones. The religious objection to working in an armaments factory expressed in Thomas has profound political ramifications.
The current efforts of the Christian Right must be characterized as political as well as religious, and this political involvement is not unique. 92 Religious organizations took a major
role in opposition to the Vietnam War. Favoritism toward religious exercise may therefore either directly or indirectly result
in official promotion of the ideas embodied within the religious
exercise.
189. Id. at 622-23.
190. The argument is not that religious organizations should be excluded
from the political arena, but rather, that religious organizations should not be
accorded any special preference when exercising their rights of political expression. See generally Gaffney, supra note 187; Laycock, supra note 14, at

1393.
191. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1975).
192. See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d
849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). In ChristianEchoes, a religious organization claimed that its free exercise rights were violated when it
was denied a tax exemption for engaging in political activity. Although the religious group argued that its religion mandated involvement in politics, the court
found no free exercise or free speech violation. Id. at 857.
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The problem of favoritism for religious exercise is demonstrated by two examples which currently are the source of litigation: religious claims of exemption from charitable
solicitation laws193 and religious claims for mandatory tax ex-

emption.

94

Charitable solicitations are, of course, requested

for a variety of causes, including those of a political nature.
193. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert.
filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1981) (No. 80-1207). In Espinosa the court
held that a city ordinance which regulated charitable solicitations and exempted solicitations by religious groups where the solicitations were for "evangelical, missionary or religious but not secular purposes" violated the first
amendment, because the ordinance forced public officials to define religious activities. 634 F.2d at 482.
194. Under the approach posited in this Article, a tax exemption denied to a
secular organization should not be granted to a religious organization simply
because of the organization's religious nature. The Supreme Court has not yet
resolved this issue. The problem may be illustrated by comparing Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-3), and its companion case, Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), affid (unreported), cert granted, 50 U.SJL.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981), with Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978),
and Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980).
In Bob Jones University, the university sued for back taxes paid when the
Internal Revenue Service revoked the university's tax exempt status on
grounds that the university's rules prohibiting interracial dating and marriage
violated public policy. 639 F.2d at 149. The university had argued that its policies were based on religious beliefs in nonmiscegenation and that denial of its
tax exempt status was a violation of the free exercise and establishment
clauses. The court held that revocation of the university's tax exempt status
did not contravene the first amendment, reasoning that any free exercise infringement was indirect and was justified by the government's compelling interest in preventing racial discrimination. Id. at 154. Similarly, in Goldsboro,
the school sought recovery of taxes when its tax exempt status was revoked
based on a school policy of maintaining racial discrimination. 436 F. Supp. at
1315-16. The court held there was no violation of either free exercise or establishment, reasoning that tax exemptions are granted as a matter of public policy and therefore may be denied if the religious organization violates federal
public policy against racial discrimination. Id. at 1320.
The issue in Runyon was whether a private, nonsectarian school was prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 from practicing racial discrimination in admissions. 427 U.S. at 163. The court said yes, and the issue after Runyon was
whether a religious school would be exempt from liability under § 1981 and allowed to discriminate racially on free exercise grounds. That issue was addressed in Brown, and in a plurality opinion the court held that racial
segregation practices by a sectarian school are not protected by the first
amendment. 556 F.2d at 313-14. Although the majority agreed on the result,
they did not agree on the issue of whether the school's practice of segregation
constituted a religious belief. The majority found the discriminatory policy to
be social or political rather than religious; thus, the discrimination practiced by
the school did not represent exercise of religion and was not protected by the
first amendment. Id. at 311. In Fiedler, however, the court suggested that a
religious school might properly discriminate on the basis of race, on free exercise grounds, 631 F.2d at 1150-51, but held that there was no evidence to support
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Many states require secular organizations to file statements indicating how they raised money and where the money was
spent. Current challenges brought under the free exercise
clause argue that such requirements may not be constitutionally maintained against a religious organization.195 However,
the failure of religious organizations to comply with regulations
applicable to other organizations that are in effect competing
with the religious organizations for the same funds provides an
unfair advantage to the religious advocates. Because spending
money is speech,196 and because the power to obtain and spend
money has dramatic implications for the political process, exemptions from charitable solicitation laws may give religious
organizations a more powerful presence in the political arena
than their secular counterparts.
The argument that religious organizations are entitled to
tax exemptions leads to similar results.197 The syllogism is
analogous: freedom from taxation is money, money is speech,
and the freedom to be excused from taxation provides a greater
power of speech to the exempted party. One dollar donated to
the school's claim that its discrimination was based on religious belief; id. at
1153-54.
Broum therefore suggests that political beliefs are not sufficient grounds to
allow racial discrimination in violation of § 1981, while Fiedler suggests that
religious beliefs would be sufficient grounds to allow the same racial discrimination. Further, Runyon suggests that a nonsectarian school may not practice
racial discrimination, while the issue remains open in Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro as to whether a religious school may practice the same racial discrimination on free exercise or establishment grounds.
See generally Bagni, Discriminationin the Name of the Lord: A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations,79 CoLum. L. REV.
1514 (1979) (denial of tax exempt status to religious schools which racially discriminate presents establishment clause and free exercise clause tensions); Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially DiscriminatoryReligious Schools, 36
TAX L. REV. 477 (1981); Comment, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979) (assessing current state of Internal Revenue Service attempts to deny tax exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools and need for judicial
intervention).
195. See supra note 193.
196. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). See also Polsby, Buckley v.
Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Wright,
Politicsand the Constitution: Is Money Speech, 85 YALE UJ. 1001 (1976).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982). In Lee, the Court
refused to carve out an exemption from the national social security system for
the Amish, a religious sect opposed to payment or receipt of social security
benefits. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted the problems inherent in
legislative exemptions to comprehensive national tax systems include defining
the exempt category so as to keep the category narrow and readily identifiable.
Id. at 1057-58 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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a tax exempt organization is worth more than one dollar
donated to an organization without tax exempt status.
To argue that the Constitution requires favoritism toward
religious practices, therefore, has profound political implications. Acceptance of the argument would mean that, as a constitutional matter, religious ideas are to be accorded a special
status in the marketplace of ideas. Besides implicating establishment clause problems, such a result cuts at the very heart
of the freedom of expression. As stated by Professor Karst, the
first amendment guarantees "equal liberty of expression."198
No class of ideas shall maintain a preferred right to be expressed. This guarantee assumes the equal dignity of each individual through self-expression and is fundamental to
affording equal dignity to each idea as it competes for recognition.199 Granting religious ideas and religiously motivated
speakers a particular exemption not available to other types of
ideas denies equal liberty of expression.
There are difficult problems even with legislative accommodation of religious organizations. 200 Legislative accommodation, however, is a wholly different question than the question
of judicially created exemptions. A judicially created exemp198. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
Cm. L. REV. 20 (1975). Professor Karst sees Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), as the Court's first full pronouncement of the principle of "equal liberty of expression." Karst, supra, at 26. In Mosley, the Court
held that an ordinance prohibiting all picketing near schools except for labor
picketing denied equal protection of the laws when challenged by a political
picketer. 408 U.S. at 95-96. Because the Mosley decision rested on fourteenth
amendment equal protection grounds, yet concerned an issue traditionally analyzed exclusively under the first amendment, the decision "squarely addressed
the relationship between the equality principle and the first amendment."
Karst, supra, at 27.
199. See Karst, supra note 198, at 23-26. Karst identifies three fundamental
purposes underlying the first amendment principle of equal liberty of expression: (1) to permit informed choices by citizens in a self-governing democracy,
(2) to aid in the search for truth; and (3) to permit each person to develop and
exercise his or her capacities, thus promoting the sense of individual selfworth. Id. at 23.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1058 n.2 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens advocated employing a strong presumption
against even legislative exemptions in order to keep legislatures "out of the
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims." Id. According to Carey v. Brown and Mosley, however, if activities undertaken in the
name of free exercise are speech, then any legislative exemptions that would
be tantamount to a content based regulation would have to be supported by a
compelling state interest. Accomodation of religious values may be seen as a
compelling state interest. Simply because a state's legislative interest in accommodating religion is compelling, does not mean that accommodation is constitutionally required. Indeed, this seems to be one of the major errors of the
Court in deciding cases under the religion clauses.
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tion means that a prejudice in favor of the religious organization is required by the Constitution. On the other hand, a
congressional decision to favor religious groups along with
other organizations, so long as the decision does not violate the
establishment clause,2 01 does not suggest that the choice was
mandated by the free exercise clause. A congressional decision
to favor religion that does not violate the establishment clause
simply means that all religious favoritism is not prohibited by
the Constitution. 202 The establishment clause and the free
speech clause at the least demonstrate that a prejudice in favor
of religion is not required by the Constitution.
B.

REJECTING THE ARGUMENT FOR A SPECIAIZED TREATMENT

FOR RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE

Although the Court has rejected the claim that religious
practices require more stringent protection than nonreligious
activities, the Court's decisions in Thomas, Yoder, and Sherbert
establish that, in deciding the scope of constitutionally permissible exclusions from laws of general applicability, the Court
will define the religious exercise exclusion more broadly than
the free expression exclusion, based on a specialized treatment
for religious conscience. 203 One cannot overemphasize, however, that these are the only three cases that have accorded
religious exercise greater protection. Moreover, because religious conscience has never been protected in all circumstances, 204 the question is essentailly where to draw the line in
defining the scope of protected religious conscience.
This Article advocates drawing the line at the protection
extended to conscience, including religious conscience, in the
expression cases. Before reaching the considerations that support this position, it is worth noting that this approach would
not be a major incursion on the existing case law that accords
special protection to rights of religious conscience. Even in
these kinds of cases, elements of expression may be at stake.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,205 for example, the question was
201. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 n.1 (1970) (state's grant
of property tax exemptions to religious organizations upheld where exemption
applied to religious, charitable, and benevolent groups).
202. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
203. See Note, supra note 59, at 1077 (Sherbert "crystallized the doctrine
that there is a 'zone of required accommodation' in which the state must use
religious classifications to prevent direct or indirect burdens on religion" unless
contrary compelling state interest exists).
204. See supra note 110.
205. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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whether the state could constitutionally convict the Amish for
failing to comply with a compulsory education requirement,
which the Amish argued violated their free exercise rights. The
claim cited in Yoder, freedom from compulsory education, is so
akin to what has traditionally been considered a free expression claim that it is questionable whether the case was properly decided on free exercise grounds. First, the Amish sought
to have their children free from the influence of secular education, which implicated their associational rights in being forced
to attend a public school.206 Second, as noted by Professor
Pfeffer, the issue in Yoder might well be described as the freedom to learn, or perhaps not to learn, a right traditionally in the

province of the speech clause. 207

206. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976) (freedom of association does not protect the practice of excluding blacks from private schools); L.
TIMBE, supra note 65, § 14-1, at 812 ("[a]ny attempt to constitutionalize the relationship of the state to religion must address the fact that much of religious life
is inherently associational").
207. See Pfeffer, supra note 47, at 1120 (because freedom to learn is protected by the first amendment, it follows that the freedom not to learn is also a
protected first amendment right). Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1968) (first amendment forbids statutes prohibiting teaching of evolution).
Finding elements of expression in the other two religious conscience
cases-Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963)-is attenuated, but by no means without support in the cases.
Thomas involved the issue whether a state could constitutionally deny unemployment compensation to an individual who claimed his religious beliefs precluded him from working in an armaments factory. The Court held that the
individual's right to the unemployment benefit was protected by the free exercise clause. Id. at 716. The case gives rise to questions of coerced association
with a business producing armaments. More important, the Thomas claimant's
free exercise right was based on his religious opposition to war, id. at 716, and
his refusal to work may be seen to communicate this view by symbolic conduct.
For example, in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), the Court found that
a person who put a peace sign on a flag in order to express his opposition to
war was engaged in a speech activity. Id. at 406. A person's refusal to work in
an armaments factory is no less a statement against war than was the defendant's claim in Spence.
In Sherbert the issue was whether an unemployment compensation applicant could be denied benefits for failing to work on Saturdays on account of
religious belief. The Court decided that the denial of benefits was unconstitutional under the free exercise clause. 374 U.S. at 410. One commentator, writing before the Wooley decision, argued that Sherbert could not be explained as
resting on free expression grounds since the symbolic qualities of Mrs. Sherbert's acts were minimal and her motivation was not primarily one of communication. See Clark, supra note 68, at 336.
The validity of these distinctions becomes questionable in light of Wooley.
In Wooley, the Court recognized that Maynard did not have an intention to
communicate and the symbolic nature of his obstruction of the state motto on
his license plate was minimal. 430 U.S. at 713 n.10. Nonetheless, the Court
found Maynard's right of expression at issue, holding that his freedom of mind
was violated by the state's imposition of its motto on his license plate. Id. at
714. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Abood v. De-
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The purpose of the foregoing is not to argue that Yoder
would have been decided the same way if litigated as a free expression case. The Court was adamant that the result would
not have been the same absent the religious aspect of the litigants' claims. 208 Rather, Yoder demonstrates that because elements of expression may exist in a case in which the Court has
vindicated a free exercise interest, limiting free exercise protection to expression contours, as this Article proposes, may
not be a significant encroachment on the latitude of conscientious claims recognized as implicating first amendment
concerns.
More important, allowing the religious exemption in Yoder
illustrates the danger in continuing an independent free exercise approach. If protected rights of expression were present in
the case, the Court erred in not expanding its relief to include
nonreligious claimants. To hold otherwise would be to express
a favoritism toward religious exercise that, as has been shown,
is constitutionally inappropriate. 209 The fear that a broader
definition for protectable free exercise claims may effectively
favor religious liberties over nonreligious liberties is not without foundation. At least one commentator has argued that
Yoder accomplished precisely this result.2 10
In addition to potentially leading the Court into favoring
religion over speech, the Court's current approach favors religious values over nonreligious values even when expression interests are not clearly implicated. Implicit in the approach to
troit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), the Court construed first amendment
rights within the working place and held that it was unconstitutional to force a
public employee to violate his or her rights of conscience by paying union dues
used for political purposes. Id. at 234. Abood and Wooley cannot be distinguished from Sherbert on conscience grounds, because forcing Mrs. Sherbert to
work on a day prohibited by her religion was exactly the same sort of affront to
her freedom of mind or her freedom to maintain the integrity of her beliefs as
was present in Wooley and Abood.
Any possible distinction must therefore rest on the argument that Wooley
and Abood involved coerced expression of another's beliefs, even though in
Wooley the objector could have dissociated himself from the message expressed, and did not simply rest on conscience grounds alone. It is arguable,
however, that no less coerced expression occurs when one is forced to work
than when one is forced to pay union dues or to exhibit a state motto on a license plate. One's work may be as much a statement of one's ideas as one's
union or license plate. Thus, although Sherbert may be less conducive to an expression analysis than Thomas or Yoder, the construction of Sherbert as an expression case is not as marked an extension of the existing jurisprudence as
one might initially suppose.
208. See 406 U.S. at 215.
209. See supra notes 170-202 and accompanying text.
210. See Pfeffer, supra note 47, at 1140.
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religious exercise proposed in this Article, however, is the
premise that no principled basis exists for allowing individuals
to be exempted from laws of general applicability solely on the
basis of religious conscience. There are many circumstances in
which a nonreligious claimant may have a legitimate objection
to the regulation to which religious claimants have sought exemption on religious grounds. For example, one might object
to employment in an armaments factory on moral or philosophical grounds as well as on religious grounds. Nonetheless,
under the Court's current approach, only religious claimants
would be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits after refusing to work in the armaments factory. 211 Because the
premise of protecting religious conscience is the prevention of
psychic harm 212 brought about by compelled violation of conscience, there is no reason not to extend the exemption to nonreligious claimants as well. The critical element in preventing
psychic harm is assessing the strength of the conscientiously
held belief. Although traditional religious beliefs may be motivated by a strong conscience, the same may be said of most
moral beliefs.213 Indeed, many moral or philosohical beliefs are
held with deeper conviction than are many religious beliefs.
Often the same individuals may have moral principles- violations of which would generate far more significant psychic
harm than would a violation of their religious beliefs. One need
only think of people whose religious beliefs technically forbid
them from working on the sabbath, but whose moral or philosophical position forbids them from killing in a war. The
Court's current approach anomalously suggests that while such
persons could refuse Saturday work, they would be required to
go to war. Such an approach serves no intelligible policy.214
211. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
212. See Clark, supra note 68, at 337, 342 (free exercise clause protects individual from the exceptional harm that results from compelling activity contrary
to one's conscience); Note, supra note 59, at 1056 (inviolability of conscience is
thought to be a precondition of emotional well-being).
213. See M. KoNvrrz, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 99 (1968)
("[P]ersons who avow religions beliefs . .. do not hold a monopoly on conscience.").
Ronald Dworkin explains that although there may be utilitarian arguments
in favor of limiting exceptions to laws of general applicability to religious
grounds, those reasons should not count as grounds for limiting a right: "A
government that is secular on principle cannot prefer a religious to a nonreligious morality as such." R. Dwoium, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 201 (1977). See
also Giannella, supra note 106, at 1431 (nontheistic conscientious objections
based on deep personal beliefs should receive equal treatment to theistically
based scruples).
214. One possible method to resolve this difficulty would be to adopt a
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This Article takes the position that, by limiting the freedom
"to manifest dissent to the parameters of the free speech clause,
no significant encroachment on fundamental interests results.
Generally, religious conscience is affirmed through expressive
activities manifesting closely held religious beliefs, or is most
substantially infringed when it is violated by laws requiring a
contrary manifestation. Both of these aspects of religious conscience, however, are protected by free speech principles.
Prayer; worship and ritual are all protected within freedom of
expression, 215 and Wooley v. Maynard and its progeny 216 accord a broad protection to religious conscience by recognizing a
freedom from coercive beliefs. Consequently, the only aspect
of religious conscience not covered under the free expression
mantle is conscience infringed by statutes of general applicability that are not directed at affecting any communicative beliefs.
Extending favored protection to religious conscience under
these circumstances violates principles of equal treatment.
The approach suggested in this Article reflects the
Supreme Court's attitude during the 1930's and 1940's, when the
interests of religious freedom and free speech were conjoined. 217 Currently, in cases other than those allegedly involving only religious conscience, free exercise claims have not
2 18
been sustained unless combined with a free speech claim.
219
There is no reason to treat religious conscience differently.
broad reading of religion in the free exercise clause. For example, the Court
could hold that it is constitutionally required to grant exemptions to a law of
general applicability to all persons who object to the law because the law infringes an ultimate concern inextricably related to the identity of those persons. See Note, supra note 59, at 1072-75. Although the constitutional basis of
this classification may be defensible because it rests on notions of equal treatment, such a broad interpretation presents other problems. See, e.g., id. at

1075-83. A major problem is that recognizing a great range of objections to laws
of general applicability would require a basic rethinking of liberal democratic

theory, which is premised on the concept of subordinating the individual conscience to the will of the majority. See Merel, supra note 59, at 812 (government premised on the subordination of individual conscience to majority rule);
Note, supra note 11, at 362 & n.74 (basic premise of democratic theory is that
laws take precedence over individual beliefs). Cf.J. LOcKE, OF CIVIL GovERNMENT AND LETrERS ON TOLERATION 49 (1947); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
212, 368-71 (1971).

215. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
218. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
219. This has been the approach adopted by the Court in cases involving
both secular and religious conscience such as Wooley. See supra notes 126-31
and accompanying text. Freedom of conscience is not unique or central to free
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MILITATING IN FAVOR OF UTILIZING

AN EXPRESSION ANALYSIS
In addition to concerns of favoritism, other problems associated with free exercise jurisprudence argue for treating free
exercise claims no differently than free expression claims
either in the definition of protected claims or in the extent of
protection allowed. First, this approach may actually serve to
protect religious liberty by eliminating the inquiry into the
sincerity of one's beliefs and by minimizing the need to set
forth judicially a constitutional definition of religion. Sincerity
has been found to be such an elusive problem that Justice
Jackson, writing in United States v. Ballard,220 found the issue
to be insoluble. 22 1 But a more central problem stems from the
governmental inquiry itself. Any attempts to discern the
sincerity of individual beliefs requires a cross-examination of
values that might easily become an inquisition.2 22 So long as
exemptions are based exclusively on the free exercise clause,
these dangers exist.22
The problem of discerning sincerity is solved, however, by
linking the free exercise and free speech clauses. The free
speech clause protects expressions of religious conscience and
proscribes infringement on conscience from governmental attempts to coerce beliefs without engaging courts in subjective
and intrusive inquiries. Thus, in Wooley, the Court did not
have to inquire into the genuineness and import of the challenger's objections to find the law constitutionally infirm. The
mere fact that the dissident found the views the government
exercise. As one commentator has stated, "[p]ersonal conscience is one of the
least distinctive elements in religious life . . . ." Note, supra note 11, at 357.
Prayer, after all, is much more central as a manifestation of religious exercise
than the more tangential right of conscience.
220. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).

221. Id. at 86.
222. Chief Justice Warren wrote that "a state-conducted inquiry into the
sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs [is] a practice which a state might
believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious
guarantees." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
223. [T]he dangers of undue governmental involvement in matters of
personal faith cannot be wholly eliminated in the cases that remain un-

avoidably linked to the free exercise clause: however generous a test

of sincerity and centrality [of religious beliefs] is adopted, however
hard courts try not to impose any uniform orthodoxy, and however
genuinely they attempt to limit evidence in such cases to intrinsic indications of fraud, they are already engaged in a treacherous business indeed when they try to assess the place that religion occupies in a
person's life or the sincerity with which religious views are held.
L. TamE, supra note 65, § 14-12, at 865.
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sought to coerce abhorrent was sufficient to strike down the
legislation.
Definitional problems are similarly minimized by using the
approach posited in this Article. One of the inquiries normally
before the Court in a free exercise challenge is whether the
challenge is religiously motivated or-based on a philosophical
or moral objection masquerading as religious. This inquiry
would become wholly unnecessary. The Court would not be
forced to undertake the delicate task of defining religion in the
free exercise context. That task may very well be unsuited to
the judicial function and itself may violate first amendment
concern.224
A final benefit in adopting expression analysis in religion
cases is, that it would effectively promote state neutrality in
religious matters and would eliminate the so-called tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses. 22 5 If an ex-

emption given to a free exercise claim were also given to
parallel speech claims, then an effectively neutral position
would be maintained with respect to religion, guaranteeing
equal treatment of all manifestations of dissent to laws of general applicability. Interestingly, this would implement Professor Kurland's neutrality approach 226 while combating critics
224. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. A constitutional definition of religion may still be required in establishment cases, but avoiding it in
matters implicating free exercise would eliminate personal inquiries and crossexamination of an individual's beliefs. Whether or not a matter is religious
would be evaluated in the abstract and not with reference to thought processes
peculiarly personal to the individual. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1963) (twenty-one word prayer composed by the state deemed to be religion).
Eliminating the necessity of defining religion in the free exercise context would
also reduce the conflict between the religion clauses, which has led some to advocate that religion be defined differently in establishment clause cases than in
free exercise clause cases. See L TmE,supra note 65, § 14-6, at 828-29. A
broad definition of religion in free exercise cases has led to unduly restrictive
establishment clause results. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979)
(teaching of transcendental meditation in the public schools held to violate the
establishment clause).
225. For a sampling of the commentaries attempting to reconcile the religion clauses, see M. KoNvrrz, supra note 213; P. KuRLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW (1962); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling
the Conflict 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1980); Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the
United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WiS. L. REV. 217; Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrine Development Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle,81 HARv.L. REV. 513 (1968).
226. Professor Kurland argues that the two religion clauses are reconciled
under a single neutrality principle which provides that governmental actions
based on secular purposes are permissible under both clauses, notwithstanding
any incidental effects upon religion. Under Professor Kurland's approach, religious beliefs afford no special exemption from laws of general applicability, and
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who have suggested that his neutrality approach minimizes the
227
individual freedom protected by the free exercise clause.
Under the standards set forth in free expression cases, religious rights would be protected by the compelling state interest
test. If the state's interest in regulating the activities in question is not compelling, then the state regulation fails. At the
same time, since no exemption is created solely for religious
activity, the result would satisfy Professor Kurland's test that
religion may not be used as a basis of classification for purposes of governmental action. 228 Furthermore, the so-called
tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses
would be eliminated. If special exemptions were not granted to
activities undertaken in the name of religion, then there would
be no question of establishment.
Despite the benefits to religious liberty in eliminating the
need for an inquiry into sincerity, and definitional and establishment problems in free exercise cases, there is no question
that some religious claims protected under the Court's current
approach may go unvindicated. Because of the narrower definition accorded religious conscience, for example, it is likely that
Sherbert would have had to be decided differently.
The proposed approach has other ramifications. For example, if there could be no judicially created exemptions for religious activities solely on free exercise grounds, this would
229
to
mean that the exemption granted in Wisconsin v. Yoder
those expressing religious opposition to compulsory education
could not be granted unless people with secular objections
would be similarly excused. Using this approach may result in
a limitation of free exercise rights in some instances, although
the same constitutional test, the "compelling state interest"
test, has been used by the Court in both free expression and
free exercise cases.230 The application of the same test will not,
however, always lead to the same results.
thus free exercise does not provide any special protection which might implicate establishment clause concerns. See P. KuRLAND, supra note 225, at 112;
Kurland, supra note 17, at 24. For a sampling of the commentary supporting
Kurland's thesis, see Giannelia, supra note 225, at 527; Weiss, supra note 21, at

617-18.
227. See Choper, supra note 225; Merel, supra note 59.
228. P. KURLAND, supra note 225, at 112.
229. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
230. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). See also Merel, supra note 59, at 821 (state interference with free exercise clause permitted only when essential for the

accomplishment of an essential state purpose).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:545

For example, if in Thomas the state was required to grant
an exemption to everyone who objected to working in an armaments factory, it undoubtedly would be faced with a far greater
number of claimants than if the exemption were limited to
those opposed to armaments work solely on religious grounds.
The fact that more people would be seeking such exemptions
would create profound difficulties in educational administration, in fiscal integrity, and in investigation of potentially insincere claims. Such increased difficulties might render the state
interest in denying the exemption more compelling. That is,
while the state's interest might not be compelling with respect
to one or a limited number of potential claimants, it might be
compelling with respect to a large number of potential claimants. Thus, under the standard posited here, an exemption
might be denied, while it might have been allowed if the standard only permitted exemptions based on religious conscience.
The denial of an exemption because of the breadth of the
class potentially subject to exclusion may actually have occurred in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.231 In that case, the plaintiffs sought an
exemption from a rule that required all persons to solicit funds
or distribute literature only from designated booth spaces at
the Minnesota State Fair. The Minnesota Supreme Court
found the state's interest in limiting this activity to booths not
compelling when measured against the free exercise interests
of the limited number of Krishnas who sought to solicit on the
fairgrounds. 232 After the plaintiffs argued that the exemption
from booth space must be granted to everyone exercising
speech rights, the United States Supreme Court reached a different result. 23 3 Instead of the possibility of accommodating
only a handful of peripatetic solicitors, the state was then faced
with the possibility of thousands of people seeking funds or
distributing literature throughout the fairgrounds. The specter
of this possibility added to the state's argument that it had a
compelling interest in reducing congestion and in limiting fraud
by restricting all solicitations to booth spaces.
It is submitted, however, that even if the posited analysis
restricts free exercise in circumstances such as that in Heffron,
this minimal restriction is far outweighed by the principles of
231.
232.
N.W.2d
233.

452 U.S. 640 (1981).
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299
79, 81 (Minn. 1980).
See 452 U.S. at 652-54.
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equal liberty of expression and conscience that underlie the
proposed theory. Moreover, the approach eliminates most of
the more severe jurisprudential difficulties that have plagued
free exercise analysis. Finally, as has been shown, the proposed approach does not result in a substantial reduction in
the protection afforded religious activities, and indeed has been
foreshadowed by religious liberty cases.
CONCLUSION
Interpretation of the free exercise clause has proved to be
especially troublesome for the Supreme Court. Surprisingly,
however, neither the Court nor commentators have looked to
the first amendment's other freedom, the freedom of expression, as a guidepost in examining the parameters of the free exercise guarantee. This failure to link the first amendment
clauses has occurred even though the cases have clearly
demonstrated that the interests protected by free exercise can
be, and indeed have been, protected under the free speech
clause. In short, the Court's jurisprudence has already established that there is no constitutionally definable interest protected by the free exercise clause that is not simultaneously
protected to some extent by the free expression clause.
At the same time, there is at least an implication in the
cases that the freedom of conscience, although in some instances protected as speech and in others as free exercise, may
receive a broader protection under the guarantee of religious
freedom. It has also been suggested that even when the Court
has acknowledged that freedom of expression and free exercise
overlap, a more stringent protection may be required for those
expressing religious interests than for those expressing secular
claims. Policy reasons and an analysis of the cases suggest
that neither of these results is warranted.
The analysis posited by this Article is straightforward. Any
judicially created exemption granted to those expressing a religious interest may be constitutionally required only when such
an exemption would be similarly required for those expressing
parallel free speech claims. Although this approach might tend
to limit the scope of the free exercise protection in some instances, it would simplify free exercise analysis by removing
problems of definition and inquiry into sincerity. It would also
promote neutrality in church-state relations because religious
ideas would never be accorded favored status. Similarly, it
would eliminate the establishment clause problems associated
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with the current free exercise test, and would recognize that
the freedoms of the first amendment are cohesive and unitary.
Freedom of expression necessarily affects freedom of religious
exercise and freedom of religious exercise necessarily affects
freedom of expression. This cohesive interpretation of the first
amendment freedoms first appeared in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases of the 1930's and 1940's, but apparently has been
forgotten since. The approach set forth in those cases should
again be followed in free exercise analysis.

